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ACTIVITIES OF FOREIGN ECONOMIC INTERESTS OPERATING IN NAMIBIA

Report of Standing Committee II

Chairman: Mr. Shaukat UMER (Pakistan)

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INTRODUCTION

1. Following the termination of South Africa's Mandate over South West Africa (subsequently called Namibia) by General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966, and in accordance with the mandate entrusted to it by General Assembly resolution 2248-S-V of 19 May 1967 as the legal Administering Authority for Namibia until independence, the United Nations Council for Namibia has considered the activities of foreign economic interests operating in Namibia with a view to recommending appropriate policies to the Assembly in order to counter the support which those interests give to the illegal South African administration in Namibia.

2. Despite the adoption of many resolutions by the United Nations, the pronouncement of the International Court of Justice in its advisory opinion of 21 June 1971 1/ and the enactment of Decree No. 1 for the Protection of the Natural Resources of Namibia 2/ by the United Nations Council for Namibia on 27 September 1974, South African, Western and other foreign economic interests have continued to plunder the Territory's natural resources.

3. The present report, which was prepared pursuant to General Assembly resolution 43/26 A of 17 November 1988, updates the most recent report of the Council for Namibia on the activities of foreign economic interests operating in Namibia (A/AC.131/286).

I. PLUNDER OF NAMIBIA'S RESOURCES BY FOREIGN ECONOMIC INTERESTS

A. General

4. Namibia is endowed with abundant natural wealth, including uranium, gem diamonds, semi-precious stones, salt, marble, copper, lead, zinc, manganese and other metals, as well as agricultural and fishery resources.

5. The economic history of Namibia shows a consistent pattern of collusion and mutual support between the illegal South African occupation régime and the transnational corporations operating in the Territory. The apartheid régime has maintained administrative, legal and social conditions in which foreign ventures can reap large profits from their plunder of Namibia's economic and human resources. The transnationals, in turn, have assisted South Africa in its illegal occupation of Namibia by paying taxes, providing fuel and other supplies for the occupation forces and by collaborating with South Africa in its violation of international law and its defiance of international institutions seeking self-determination and independence for Namibia.

6. The foreign exploitation of Namibia's resources has taken three fundamental forms. First, the human resource development of the Namibian people has been stunted by apartheid "bantu" education and the fact that under apartheid, the policy of "job reservation" ensures that skilled jobs go to the white minority.

Secondly, South Africa has appropriated 60 per cent of the total land area, comprising the most arable farmland and the mineral concessions, for the exclusive use of the white minority. Blacks, who make up 95 per cent of the population of the Territory, have been herded, on the basis of the Odendaal Plan, into 10 non-contiguous barren "homelands". 3/ Thirdly, mining concessions have not been granted to Namibians; they have been granted to numerous South African and other foreign economic interests which are thus able to exploit the mineral resources of Namibia which are the heritage of the people of the Territory.

7. The gap between Namibia's gross domestic product (GDP), which represents the total value of goods and services produced in the Territory, and the gross national product (GNP), which represents the total value after foreign payments are made, shows the extent to which foreign economic interests exploit the Territory's resources. It has been estimated that between 16 and 20 per cent of Namibia's GDP is remitted abroad, mainly in the form of profits taken out by foreign corporations operating in the Territory. 4/

8. Although it is a mineral-rich country, Namibia has had its mining sector developed without a link to the rest of the economy. Minerals account for almost half the GDP and 85 per cent of the total exports. Yet the industry employs only 8 per cent of the black work-force. 5/

9. The mining industry, with a current annual output value of around R 1 billion,* is the most lucrative sector of the economy. Three corporations account for 95 per cent of mineral production and 75 per cent of exports by value and hold 80 per cent of the Territory's mineral concessions. The three are Consolidated Diamond Mines of South West Africa, Ltd. (CDM), a wholly owned subsidiary of De Beers Consolidated Mines, Ltd. of South Africa, which in turn is owned at 30 per cent by the Anglo American Corporation of South Africa, Ltd.; the Tsumeb Corporation, Ltd. (TCL), owned principally by Gold Fields of South Africa (GFSA); and Rössing Uranium, Ltd., in which the Rio Tinto Zinc Corporation, Ltd. (RTZ) of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland owns the majority of the capital but, owing to weighted share value, South Africa controls the votes.

10. The South African Government, banking institutions and corporations are heavily involved in the inshore fishing and lobster industries. The prominent exploiters of mineral resources include CDM, Anglo American and two parastatals: the Iron and Steel Corporation of South Africa, Ltd. (ISCOR) which operates the Rosh Pinah and Uis mines (see map), and the Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa, Ltd. (IDC). The transport and communication sector, including railways, roads and harbours, is integrated with and administered by South African interests. International and domestic flights to and within Namibia were, until recently, exclusively part of the South African network.

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* The rand has fluctuated in value against the United States dollar in recent years from R 1 = $1 in 1985 to R 2.76 = $1 in 1989.

11. The Western European corporations that operate or invest in Namibia include RTZ, the British Petroleum Company (BP) and Consolidated Gold Fields, all based in the United Kingdom; Dresdner Bank of the Federal Republic of Germany; and the Shell Transport and Trading Company, Ltd., a part of the Royal Dutch/Shell Group. These companies are involved in uranium mining and exploration, gold mining, oil and gas exploration and sales, banking and the marketing of karakul products abroad.

12. The North American companies include the Caltex Petroleum Corporation, based in the United States of America and owned by the Standard Oil Company, Texaco, Inc., and the Mobil Corporation. Brilund Limited, registered in Liechtenstein, recently transferred mineral and oil concessions to an American company registered in Delaware. The Canadian-based company, Rio Algom, Ltd., is also involved in Namibia through its interest in Rössing Uranium, Ltd. From 1947, the United States companies Amax Corporation and the Newmont Mining Corporation were involved in Namibia through shareholdings in Tsumeb Corporation, Ltd. (TCL), which operates four mines. 6/ Amax sold its interests in 1982 to GFSA, a subsidiary of Consolidated Gold Fields, Ltd., of the United Kingdom; the Newmont Mining Corporation sold its share to the same company in April 1988.

13. The huge profits which transnational corporations extract from their illegal operations in Namibia are generally transferred abroad with no portion spent for development purposes in the Territory. Nor have foreign economic interests taken any measures to integrate the different sectors of the Namibian economy. As a result, the Territory has an unbalanced and distorted economy that is totally dependent upon foreign imports.

14. The Thirion Commission of Inquiry report, published in March 1986, confirmed the high degree of foreign ownership and inadequacy of the regulatory powers in the mining industry and the mismanagement and corrupt practices prevailing in the "second-tier" ethnic authorities. In particular, it found that there was a failure to monitor diamond mining and exports and in general there were inadequate independent inspection procedures. 7/

15. In sum, the present commercial structures and international economic relations of Namibia epitomize the traditional colonial practice of extracting raw materials from the colony, exploiting cheap labour services and limiting investments to those activities that would accelerate the extraction of raw materials. Such a system reserves the colony as a captive market for the goods manufactured in the metropolitan country and accommodates its surplus population. This colonial economic structure, supported by the apartheid régime imposed in the Territory, has greatly contributed to the underdevelopment of Namibia. 8/

B. Mining

Role in the economy

16. Namibia has the following mineral resources, among others, which are mined separately or occur as by-products of other ores: 9/ copper, lead, zinc, gem diamonds, cadmium, columbite, uranium, silver, gold, germanium, selenium, arsenic,

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lithium, rubidium, gallium, manganese, limestone, molybdenum, niobium, tellurium, tantalite, tungsten, semi-precious gems, iron, salt, thorium, silica, fluorspar, phosphorus, rare earths, sulphur, quartz, soda and mica.

17. The mining industry accounts for 30-40 per cent of total state revenue and approximately 85 per cent of Namibia's exports. It has not contributed to the skill development of the work-force to any meaningful extent. It draws on precious water resources, thereby causing ecological damage by lowering the water table. It causes water diversion from agriculture, pollution of water supplies and toxic pollution of the air and has failed to return profits for industrial or social development inside Namibia.

18. Despite Decree No. 1 for the Protection of the Natural Resources of Namibia, prospecting by foreign economic interests has continued unabated. In 1987, 197 new prospecting licences were issued, up from 172 in 1986. New prospecting grants also rose from 22 in 1986 to 29 in 1987. Registration of claims more than doubled after 1985. The actual totals spent on prospecting rose in 1987 by 13 per cent to R 21 million, compared with R 18 million the year before.

19. As the Thirion Commission extensively documented, the South African régime has accelerated the exploitation of Namibia's mineral resources by various means. It has, among other things, taxed the mining companies that operate in Namibia at a lower rate than those in South Africa, allowed tax write-offs of capital expenditure from gross profits, permitted the unrestricted exploitation of Namibian minerals and exerted no pressure on mining companies to process minerals locally. Table 1 shows the extent to which foreign economic interests plundered Namibia's extensive mineral resources from 1984 through 1987 (see also annexes I and III).

Table 1. Mineral production, 1984-1987

(Thousands of metric tons, except where stated otherwise)

Mineral	1984	1985	1986	1987
Cadmium	..	58	61	51
Diamonds (thousand carats)	930	910	1 010	1 020
Arsenic trioxide (tons)	2 504	2 471	2 208	1 900
Copper (blister)	48.6	47.6	50.1	37.7
Copper (concentrate) a/	..	143 400	150 000	122 500
Gold (kilograms)	196	194	184	172
Lead (refined)	28.9	38.5	40.0	40.6
Lithium minerals b/	900	1 900	2 075	3 100
Pyrite (concentrate)	172.3	174.3	189.5	120.3
Silver (tons)	96	98	105	60
Sodium antimonate	..	..	..	51
Tantalite (tons)	7	5	..	..
Tin (metal)	1.4	1.5	-	1.097
Zinc (concentrate)	56.5	57.0	60.5	70.2
Uranium oxide (tons)	3 692	3 385	3 487	4 200
Limestone	21.6	31.6	-	-
Marble (tons)	1 800	-	595	600
Salt (coarse)	85.0	146.5	130.0	124.0

Source: Country Profile: Namibia 1987-88 (London, The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1987), p. 22; Mining Annual Review 1988 (London), p. 379.

a/ Mainly smelted or refined at Tsumeb.

b/ Includes amblygonite, lepidolite, petalite, quartz, mica and beryl.

Diamonds

20. Namibia has one of the world's richest alluvial gem diamond deposits near Oranjemund on its south-western coast. Mining, exploration and processing is monopolized by CDM, wholly owned by the South African company De Beers, which has been in Namibia since 1921. De Beers in turn is part of the Anglo American group, also a South African company.

21. The original concession granted to CDM in 1921 covered a strip 352 kilometres north of the mouth of the Orange River and 96 kilometres wide. The concession was expanded up to 5 kilometres towards the sea and eventually to the end of the continental shelf. Marine recovery, however, was suspended over a decade ago but foreshore mining continues through a process of building dykes to hold the sea back. In addition to four working sites in the concession area, CDM has recently opened a new site on the north bank of the Orange River. Production is scheduled to begin in the second half of 1992. 10/ Dalsig Diamonds, part of the South African company Dalsig Mining, has recently obtained rights for two shallow-water sea concessions. 11/

22. CDM is one of the largest employers in the mining industry, with a total work-force of about 5,400. In 1987, the average monthly wage, including skilled and overtime and other payments, was R 809. However, for the unskilled worker, the wage including overtime was R 398. 12/ Two thirds of the labour force is from northern Namibia. The rest are skilled expatriates. Bearing in mind that the mine has been in operation since 1921, it is interesting to note that it took until 1972 for CDM to begin training semi-skilled employees to specialist level. It began selecting apprentices on a non-racial basis only in 1979. The programmes have continued to be insufficient chiefly because there is no real interest to Namibianize the different skill levels at the mines.

23. Approximately 98 per cent of the diamonds mined in Namibia are of gem quality with a large proportion above 1 carat in size. Gem diamond production in Namibia has fluctuated from earlier highs of 1.6 million carats annually to more recent averages of 1 million carats (see table 2) which is also the projected estimate for the 1990s. The proven and probable reserves as of 1986 were 30 million carats. The industrial diamond reserves were estimated at 30,000 carats. Thus, depending on the rate of production and other factors, the depletion of the reserves will take place in 15 to 20 years and for the new concession on the north bank of the Orange River at Auchas and at Elizabeth Bay, 10 years. 13/

24. Namibian diamonds have high average per-carat value and are rated for their good shape, fine colour and lack of impurities and faults. The price of diamonds can range in value from $6 per carat to $300 per carat. Rough diamond sale prices were raised 13.5 per cent in May 1988 and 15 per cent in March 1989. In recent years, the size of stones recovered has dropped from an average of 0.88 carat in 1972 to slightly less than 0.66 carat in 1981, reflecting the overall depletion of the reserves. Simultaneously, the ore grade is expected to fall from 0.3 carat per cubic metre in 1968 to 0.04 carat per cubic metre in 1993. 14/ Mining output is not expected to return to earlier levels of annual production, i.e., 1.5 or 1.6 million carats.

Table 2. Diamond output, 1983-1987

	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987
Material treated (Mt) a/	9.59	7.55	8.18	12.14	13.44
Diamonds recovered (Mct) b/	0.96	0.93	0.91	1.01	1.02
Grade (ct/100 t) c/	10.04	12.32	11.12	8.32	7.6

Source: The Windhoek Advertiser, 22 March 1989; Mining Annual Review 1988 (London), p. 380.

a/ Mt = millions of metric tons.

b/ Mct = millions of carats.

c/ ct/100 t = carats per hundred metric tons.

25. Diamond production and exports are controlled by South Africa through the Diamond Board of Namibia. De Beers has used the mine in Namibia to control and balance the market. The Central Selling Organization (CSO) operates a successful producers' cartel which manages the supply and price of gem diamonds. In addition, all other major producers and sellers of uncut diamonds sell through or in co-ordination with CSO. Effective control of 80 per cent of total world sales is achieved through CSO which manipulates the market by stockpiling and selective sales. In addition, De Beers, the largest gem diamond producer in the world, uses advertising to help set the trend in fashion and thereby affect demand for large and small diamonds. Recently, CDM decided to open a R 30-million sorting operation in Windhoek and appointed the British firm, Fitch and Pooly, as independent valuators to help to quiet criticisms raised in the Thirion Commission report. 15/

26. The procedures governing the export of diamonds from Namibia and the pricing and marketing policies authorized by the South Africa régime have facilitated the plunder of the Territory's diamonds by CDM. The Thirion Commission of Inquiry revealed that, as a result of the collusion between South Africa and CDM, consignments of diamonds routinely leave Namibia without export duty being paid. While testifying before the Commission, a former senior employee of CDM asserted that the Territory had lost $1.34 billion in diamond ore reserves as a result of the systematic depletion of Namibia's diamond resources by this corporation. The same employee also provided the Commission with documents showing that since the early 1970s, while attempting to meet the excessive production targets set up by De Beers and CSO, CDM had consistently followed a policy of maximizing profits by engaging in overmining in both stone size and grade. 16/

27. The report of the Thirion Commission concluded that CDM was deliberately overmining Namibia's diamond deposits and was evading taxes by transfer pricing its

diamond exports. The report further stated that "despite the trappings and façade of state control ... effective control of all aspects of the mining and marketing of [Namibia's] diamonds remains firmly in the hands of De Beers". The Commission found it "ridiculous" that the Secretary of the Diamond Board of Namibia, which assessed how much export duty CDM should pay, was also a senior employee of CDM. 17/

28. The diamond market appears to be recovering from a slump due to over-stocking and falling demand. The demand for large stones was weak until recently. De Beers has more than doubled interim diamond profits through a combination of increased sales and favourable exchange rates. 18/

Base metals, minerals and quarried material

29. The Tsumeb Corporation, Ltd. (TCL) controls 70 per cent of the base metal production in Namibia and operates four mines, the only lead refinery and copper smelter in the country and prospecting rights to more than 1 million hectares in central and north-western Namibia. 19/ The mines include Tsumeb and Otjihase, Asis East, Asis West, Kombat and Matchless (see map). They produce blister copper, refined lead, zinc, gold, silver, cadmium, iron pyrites, germanium and arsenic trioxide. In spite of falling ore grades and reserves of copper, lead and zinc, there are conflicting views on the potential life of the Tsumeb mine, which in 1975 was estimated at 13 years, but a 1987 report estimated that high-grade reserves would last until 1998. The Otjihase mine, purchased in 1982, has large ore resources and contributes more copper than Tsumeb and conceivably will help to keep the corporation profitable. 20/

30. TCL is now owned 79 per cent by Gold Fields of South Africa, 8.3 per cent by Seltrust Investments, 3.5 per cent by British Petroleum Minerals International of the United Kingdom, and 3.7 per cent by the Gencor Group. Sales revenue for 1988 was forecast at R 344 million with a pre-tax profit of R 89 million. This is based on expected copper sales of 40,000 metric tons; lead, 50,000 tons and silver, 107,000 kilograms. 21/

31. Foreign ownership, including South African, dominates the other significant mining operations in Namibia which employ more than 100 workers each. Foreign-owned mines included: of South Africa, Klein Aub (copper/silver); of South Africa and Canada, Oamites (copper/silver) and Swartmodder (copper/silver); and of the United States, Krantzberg (tungsten). GFSA controls the Berg Aukas vanadium/lead/zinc mine and the Brandberg West tin/tungsten mine. ISCOR of South Africa indirectly owns 51 per cent of the Rosh Pinah underground lead/zinc mine, with reserves of 15 years, and wholly owns the Uis open-pit tin mine, with reserves estimated at 90 years. The Uis mine also produces tantalite and columbite. 22/

32. Other mines which employ fewer than 100 workers are also owned by foreign interests. These include the Helicon and Rubicon lithium mines, owned by Klockner and Co. and the mine of the South African company Tantalite Valley Minerals, Ltd. which produces bismuth, beryl, columbite and tantalite. Salt production is dominated by South African interests 23/ whose ownership is traced to the Anglo American and Barlow Rand groups. The balance of salt production, approximately one half, is in the hands of a dozen firms with Namibian shareholders. Approximately

90 per cent of Namibia's salt is exported to South Africa for the production of chlorine, caustic soda and table salt. The rate of production is controlled by pumping, and reserves are thought to be virtually unlimited. 24/

33. The Thirion Commission of Inquiry raised a number of issues concerning taxation, in particular, and oversight or mismanagement by the illegal administration in Namibia. These include failure on the part of TCL to report the gold content of blister copper, the channelling of taxable income into expansion projects in the mines and the over-generous waiver of taxes to offset start-up or initial investment costs.

34. The Okorusu fluorspar mine went into full production in 1988, with a peak capacity of 4,000 tons monthly expected in 1989. 25/ At Navachab, a gold mine owned primarily by interests of South Africa (70 per cent) and the Federal Republic of Germany (20 per cent) was to begin production in October 1989. It has reserves of 10 billion metric tons at a grade of 2.22 grams per ton and is estimated to last 13 years. The annual treatment rate should be 750,000 tons which would produce 1,900 kilograms of gold a year. 26/

35. Dalsig Diamonds, a South African company, has started to mine amethyst, white marble, pink granite and all the major sodalite deposits in Kaokoland through its subsidiary, Dalsig Mining. The company, through its purchase of Minfen and Tshipise Minerals, has rights to a 10-million-ton deposit of green epidote and red jasper. 10/

Uranium

36. The Rössing uranium mine in Namibia is the world's largest open-pit mine. Namibia is one of the largest producers of uranium and its reserves are the eighth largest in the world. The mine was commissioned in defiance of the United Nations Council for Namibia's Decree No. 1 for the Protection of the Natural Resources of Namibia and it remains controversial not only in terms of its illegality but also because of its lax environmental controls, low wages, poor housing and secrecy concerning profits, output, taxes and sales contracts.

37. South Africa controls 55 per cent of the voting rights of Rössing Uranium, Ltd. RTZ, the British corporation, holds 46.5 per cent of the equity capital but only 26 per cent of the voting capital. The other owners include Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa with 10 per cent, Total-Compagnie Minière et Nucléaire of France with 10 per cent equity capital and Urangesellschaft mbH of the Federal Republic of Germany with 10 per cent. In addition to having weighted voting power, South Africa can, through legislation, also demand as much of the uranium as it wishes to buy. 27/

38. Rössing Uranium processes 50,000 to 60,000 metric tons of ore per day and has a production capacity of 5,250 tons of uranium oxide per year. At the request of the management of Rössing, RTZ has disclosed no production figures since 1982. However, output is believed to have been maintained at around 4,000 tons per year from 1983 to 1985 before dropping to 3,500 tons in 1986. 28/ For 1987, the United States Department of Energy listed Namibia as the fifth largest producer in the

world, with 4.8 short tons, after Canada, the United States, South Africa and Australia. 29/ Although disclosure of uranium export statistics is prohibited by South Africa's Nuclear Energy Act, it has been estimated that uranium accounted for 34 per cent of all Namibia's exports between 1981 and 1985. 30/ In 1987, the value of uranium sales increased to R 762 million and constituted 46 per cent of total Namibian mineral exports by value.

39. Rössing Uranium is a highly profitable operation for RTZ. Since 1982, it has in fact been the largest profit generator for its parent multinational. It is relatively inexpensive to produce uranium in Namibia because of racial discrimination in wages, low taxation rates and the relative freedom from social, political, environmental and other legal restraints on foreign corporations operating in the Territory. Moreover, as a result of South African legislation that allows foreign companies operating in Namibia to defer taxes against initial capital expenditure, Rössing was able to avoid paying any taxes until the 1982/83 fiscal year. 31/ The net attributable profit of RTZ from Rössing amounted to approximately £14.7 million ($25 million) in 1987, down 41 per cent from 1986. 11/

40. The illegal and unsafe exploitation of Namibia's uranium poses a dangerous threat to the health of the Namibian people. The lack of safeguards and standards to protect black workers and local inhabitants against radioactive contamination from Rössing has made the mining, processing and transportation of uranium particularly harmful to these people. The ore tailings, the substance which remains after the uranium oxide has been extracted, contain dust particles which are highly toxic for many years. Unless special and very expensive precautions are taken, the tailing heaps are slowly dispersed by wind and rain, by leaching and by run-off into three nearby rivers and into the ground water itself over a wide area. Thus, the plunder of Namibia's uranium by Rössing is likely to present a serious health and environmental hazard for generations of Namibians. 32/

41. The uranium produced in Namibia is illegally exported. The amounts sent to South Africa for its own nuclear industry are unknown. Given the illegal nature of the distribution and processing of Namibian uranium, most transport companies and processing plants have sought to conceal their involvement in Namibia's uranium resources. Further, the fact that South Africa has not become a party to the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons makes it increasingly unacceptable to handle the uranium. It is also known that firms such as Chargeurs Réunis, a French shipping company which is part of the UTA (Union des Transports Aériens) group, and Deutsche Afrika Linien, a shipping company based in the Federal Republic of Germany, have been involved in the regular transportation by sea, in containers, of Namibian uranium to several ports in Western Europe.

42. Despite the veil of secrecy over the identity of Rössing customers, it is known that RTZ has over the years managed to enter into a number of sales contracts. According to a report prepared for the United States Department of Energy by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1982, Rössing has long-term delivery contracts for uranium with the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Japan, and the United Kingdom. 33/ In April 1988, the Madrid newspaper, El País, citing information obtained from the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), reported that the Spanish State-owned National Uranium Company (ENUSA) had signed a

contract in 1983 to purchase 3,327 metric tons of Namibian uranium ore through 1991. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement which confirmed the existence of such a contract but indicated that it dated from 1974 and was due to expire in 1989 and would not be renewed. 34/ Table 3 provides information regarding known and possible uranium contracts concluded by RTZ.

Table 3. Known and possible contracts for Namibian uranium

Customer	Country processing	Amount (tons)	Expiration of contract
British Nuclear Fuels, Ltd., United Kingdom	United Kingdom	7 500	1984
Société pour la conversion de l'uranium en métal (COMURHEX), France	France	11 000	late 1980s
Veba AG, and Urangesellschaft mbH, both of Federal Republic of Germany	Netherlands	6 140	..
Kansai, Tohoku, Chusbu, and Chugoku power companies, Japan a/	United States, Canada	8 200	1986
Other Japanese corporations, including Tokoyo Electric Power Co.	United States, Canada	23 000	..
National Uranium Co. (state-owned)	Spain	3 327	1989
Taiwan Power Corporation	Netherlands	4 000	2005

Source: The New York Times, 2 November 1988; Namibia: Perspectives for National Reconstruction and Development (Lusaka, United Nations Institute for Namibia, 1986), p. 470; El País (Madrid), April 1988.

a/ These companies indicated that they had found new, more diversified and economical supply sources.

43. Although the sanctions adopted by the United States Government in October 1986 bar imports of uranium ore and uranium oxide from South Africa and Namibia, they do not cover the more highly refined uranium hexafluoride. According to press reports, this has enabled United States fuel rod fabrication plants to continue using uranium of Namibian and South African origin. 35/

44. One of the major processing companies in Europe is Urenco, Ltd., a joint venture of Uranisotopenenttrennungsgesellschaft (URANIT) of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ultra-Centrifuge Nederland N.V. (UCN) of the Netherlands and British Nuclear Fuels. Urenco does not purchase uranium for resale but is paid to enrich uranium owned by various clients. It will be recalled that on 14 July 1987 lawyers acting for the United Nations Council for Namibia served a writ of summons in the District Court of The Hague against UCN as well as Urenco Nederland, the processing plant managed by UCN, and the Government of the Netherlands (see A/AC.131/267) in order to halt enrichment operations at the Urenco plant in Almelo which were deemed to be in violation of Decree No. 1 for the Protection of the Natural Resources of Namibia. The case is still before the District Court of The Hague.

45. Some of the foreign companies involved in prospecting for uranium in Namibia include the Anglo American Corporation of South Africa, Ltd., the Union Corporation of South Africa Société Nationale Elf-Aquitaine (SNEA), Compagnie Française de Pétrole (CFP) and Pechiney-Ugine Kuhlman of France. SNEA, 70 per cent of which is owned by Entreprise de Recherche et d'Activités Pétrolières (ERAP), a French State company, is also engaged in prospecting activities through its wholly owned subsidiary Aquitaine (SWA), under a joint-venture agreement with both the Anglo American Corporation and Total-Compagnie Minière et Nucléaire of France. In 1980, SNEA made an important discovery at Damaraland, where it has prospecting areas at Tubas and Ausinas.

46. The General Mining and Finance Corporation (GMFC), a mining giant second only to the Anglo American Corporation, has discovered a substantial deposit of uranium at Langer Heinrich, about 80 kilometres south of Rössing, which is unofficially estimated to be capable of yielding from 2,500 to 3,000 tons of high-grade uranium oxide annually. GFSA, a company noted for its close ties with the Pretoria régime, is another major South African company prospecting for uranium in Namibia. GFSA is said to have located a significant deposit at Trekkopje.

Energy

47. Namibia has considerable potential resources of oil, gas and coal, none of which has yet been developed. It also has a major source of hydroelectric power in the Kunene River and potential for development of other rivers. Under the illegal South African administration, the energy policy has been geared towards the development of oil- and coal-fired power stations feeding the mining industry and the main towns. Currently, Namibia is completely dependent on imported supplies of oil and coal shipped by sea through Walvis Bay or by rail from South Africa, 36/ as well as on electricity through connection to the South African grid.

48. Foreign economic interests have been prospecting for oil and gas in Namibia for a number of years. In the early 1960s, Etosha Petroleum, a subsidiary of the Liechtenstein-registered Brilund, Limited acquired an exclusive exploration permit to prospect an area covering 260,000 square kilometres in the Etosha basin in northern Namibia, a region of great gas and oil potential. In 1988, the concession was transferred to WJZ Oil Namibia, a Delaware corporation with offices in New Jersey. It is understood that WJZ Oil will pay Brilund a minumum royalty of $500,000 a year plus 7 per cent overriding royalty on sales of the gas and oil. 37/

49. The Kudu gas field, located in the Atlantic Ocean approximately 120 kilometres west of the Namibian town of Oranjemund, has long been known to contain substantial gas reserves. Gas was first discovered in the region by Chevron, the United States oil company, under a sub-lease from the Southern Oil Exploration Corporation (Pty.), Ltd. (SOEKOR), the South African State agency responsible for offshore oil and gas exploration. Chevron and other international gas companies conducted offshore drilling along the Namibian coast in the early 1970s, but most of the concessions were relinquished by 1975 owing to unsatisfactory results.

50. SOEKOR and its counterpart based at Windhoek, the South West Africa Oil Exploration Corporation (SWACOR), expressed renewed interest in developing the Kudu gas field in 1985 following a favourable assessment by an oil-prospecting firm from Johannesburg. The firm estimated the Kudu reserves to be at least three times as large as those at Mossel Bay near Cape Town, where a major gas field is expected to come under production in the early 1990s. If that assessment was correct, the Kudu field would be capable of supplying up to 65 per cent of South Africa's fuel needs for some 30 years. The report envisaged that the gas would be piped directly to Cape Town and refined there, rather than in Namibia. 38/ That arrangement would provide a basis for the illegal Pretoria régime to attempt to retain control of the Kudu operation even after Namibia's accession to independence.

51. In October 1986, the illegal administration in Namibia granted R 25 million for a new drilling programme to SWACOR, which in turn awarded a drilling contract to the French offshore engineering company Forinter, part of the Foramer group. On 30 October 1987, work was started at a site about 7 kilometres from the hole drilled by Chevron in 1973. According to the test results announced by SWACOR in January 1988, the porosity and permeability of the gas-containing rock examined at the test site were too low for commercial production. The third test hole was drilled in early 1988 by the same French company. Analysis was being done by SOEKOR and the British firm Exploration Consultants. In spite of combined gas flow of 1.23 million cubic metres a day with 340,000 cubic metres a day being sufficient for commercial production, it was reported that Namibia did not have a viable proven gas field. 39/ Further reports in December 1988 indicated that more detailed seismic surveys would be carried out in February and March 1989 and this together with additional consultancies would cost R 1,750,000. The data would then be available for interested companies. 40/

52. Namibia consumes more than half a million metric tons of coal annually. Two thirds is used at the Windhoek coal-fired power plant. The rest is consumed by construction and services, the copper and lead industry, fishing and fish processing, manufacturing and households. All of Namibia's coal comes from South Africa by rail. Coal reserves in Namibia have been identified at Aranos, Arandis and Hochfield. 41/

53. Namibia's consumption of electricity is estimated to be around 1,260 million kWh of which half is consumed by the mining companies. Namibia's generating capacity is 550 MW, of which 60 per cent is from the Ruacana hydro-power plant and 40 per cent from diesel, coal or fuel-oil fired power stations. In addition, there are two transmission lines from South Africa with a total capacity of 300 MW.

C. Banking and finance

54. South African and other foreign economic interests completely dominate Namibia's banking and financial system. The Territory has no central bank of its own. The Reserve Bank of South Africa extends its jurisdiction and functions to illegally occupied Namibia, where the rand is the currency in use. Exchange rates, interest rates and liquidity are therefore totally dependent on decisions taken in Pretoria. As the Territory is part of the Rand Monetary Area, there is a free flow of capital between Namibia and South Africa. As a result, most South African-controlled corporations and many individuals in Namibia invest their profits or earnings in South African companies and financial institutions rather than reinvesting them within Namibia.

55. The operations of banks and non-bank financial institutions in Namibia are exclusively directed towards the needs of expatriates and of South African and other foreign economic interests. Banks in the Territory continue to be instrumental in integrating the financial and customs systems of Namibia and South Africa. They provide money for the occupying illegal administration and for foreign economic interests operating in Namibia and channel funds of their clients, as well as their own profits, into accounts in South Africa and Western Europe.

56. The non-bank financial institutions include the First National Development Corporation (FNDC), created to fund projects in the homelands, and the Land and Agricultural Bank of South West Africa, created to provide financial and non-financial assistance to settler farmers. Housing finance institutions controlled by the Administrator General are handled for upper- and middle-income groups through the South West Africa Building Society and for home loans through the National Building and Investment Corporation.

57. The major banks involved in the Territory are Standard Bank South West Africa, Ltd., a wholly owned subsidiary of Standard Bank Investment Corporation (STANBIC) of South Africa, whose net profits rose by 132 per cent in 1987 42/ and First National Bank of SWA/Namibia Limited, a wholly owned subsidiary of the First National Bank of Southern Africa, Ltd. First National Bank was the name assumed by Barclays National Bank of South Africa after Barclays Bank PLC of the United Kingdom divested itself of its 40.4 per cent share in the company in November 1986 under pressure from anti-apartheid organizations. 43/

58. The other commercial banks in Namibia include the South Africa-based Nedbank, Boland Bank and Trust Bank of Africa; the South West Africa Bank (SWABANK), a subsidiary of Dresdner Bank of the Federal Republic of Germany; and Bank Windhoek, a locally owned concern formerly under the control of the Volkskas Group of South Africa. 42/ Selected data on these banks appear in table 4.

59. In the insurance field, South African companies predominate over other foreign firms. Companies operate according to the provisions of the Insurance Act of South Africa and are supervised and controlled by the South African Registrar of Insurance. 44/ Almost all the assets of these companies are held in South Africa and it is understood that the companies regularly remove large sums of money from the Territory in the form of premium income. Their services are geared almost exclusively to the needs of the settlers and foreign companies.

Table 4. Banks in Namibia - financial data

(In millions of rand)

Institutions	Assets	Deposits	Advances	Branches/ agencies	Employees
First National Bank SWA a/	248	208	91	38	581
Standard	133	126	70	34	389
SWA Bank	27	24	13	3	50
Bank Windhoek a/	40	30	17	6	64
Trust Bank	18	11	4	4	94
Boland Bank a/	12	7	3	1	29
Nedbank a/	12	9	4	2	24
Total	490	415	202	88	1 231

Source: Namibia: Perspectives for National Reconstruction and Development (Lusaka, United Nations Institute for Namibia, 1986), p. 695.

a/ Figures for First National Bank, Bank Windhoek, Boland Bank and Nedbank are quantified approximations.

60. International banks have a long history of involvement in Namibia without necessarily maintaining commercial operations in the Territory. A British merchant bank, Hill Samuel, financed the hydroelectric scheme of South Africa's Electricity Supply Commission (ESCOM) on the Kunene River near the Angolan border. In 1979, Crenafin S.A. of Zurich, a wholly owned subsidiary of the Rothschild Bank of Switzerland, negotiated the first commercial loan to Namibia. The Standard Merchant Bank and the Volkskas Merchant Bank are known to have organized three stock issues for the illegal South African administration in Namibia in 1979/80.

61. The public finance structure in Namibia is a tool of the illegal administration and foreign corporations. It is the channel through which resources are mobilized and allocated to keep the country underdeveloped, to maintain and ensure excessive privileges of foreign corporations and white settlers through discriminatory public revenue and expenditure, to guarantee tax concessions and excessive profit repatriation for foreign corporations to keep investment expenditure to a minimum, to ensure the convenience of exports and imports in favour of South Africa, to facilitate the administration of apartheid and military rampaging and to allocate inordinate funds to recurrent expenditure for paying high salaries and fringe benefits to selected civil servants. 45/

62. The continuing collaboration of foreign banks in Namibia with racist South Africa not only supports the policies of the apartheid régime but also impedes Namibia's transition to independence. The vast network of foreign bank branches in Namibia and the financing of the South African military enables the racist régime to continue its repressive policies in Namibia and perpetuate its illegal occupation of the Territory.

D. Manufacturing and commerce

63. The manufacturing sector in Namibia produces less than 5 per cent of GDP and employs about 10 per cent of the work-force. 46/ The sector comprises approximately 300 manufacturing enterprises which include food and beverages, wood and wood products, chemical products, rudimentary metal products and printing and publishing. 47/

64. The manufacturing base of Namibia has never been developed. There has been virtually no attempt to process the primary commodities before export or to develop and promote food production industries. Approximately 80 per cent of the manufactured goods sold in Namibia are produced in South Africa and the remaining 20 per cent are imported into the Territory from elsewhere by South African-owned trading companies. South African products have unrestricted entry into Namibia, further inhibiting the growth of local industry.

65. The main manufacturing industries include food processing, the supply of some specialized equipment to the mining industry and the local assembly of goods from imported materials. 48/ South African giants, such as De Beers and the Anglo American Corporation, dominate what manufacturing does exist which tends to be highly technology and capital intensive.

66. Investment in Namibia continued in 1988 with the announcement by the Olthaver and List Group of plans to expand its R 35-million brewery by R 4.5 million. The group owns the Namib Sun chain of hotels and the local Woolworth franchise and is involved in fishing, cattle and sheep farming, meat and milk processing and construction. Sänlam and Old Mutual, two institutional developers, announced plans in 1988 for R 75 million worth of new property investment and a R 5 million capital project. 49/

E. Agriculture

67. Long before Europeans colonized their country, the Namibian people were practising forms of agriculture and land use based on a tradition of communal co-operation and sharing that contrasted sharply with the authoritarian, exploitative methods of settler farming which displaced them. The onset of colonialism was linked to the search for mineral wealth and also resulted in the wholesale seizure of land for the benefit of white settlers, whose main activities included beef cattle and karakul sheep raising and dairy farming. The dispossessed Namibians fought valiantly against this intrusion, although they were eventually forced to withdraw and suffered enormous losses. The seizure of land and the

agrarian policies imposed by the German colonizers and the current South African régime have led to the impoverishment of the Namibian people and caused severe ecological damage to their country.

68. The agricultural sector typifies the contradictions inherent in the Territory's colonial economy. Blacks, who make up more than 95 per cent of the population engaged in agriculture, are subsistence farmers, and their share of the total marketed agricultural output is only about 2.5 per cent. In contrast, about 3,800 white farmers own and manage virtually all of the farms engaged in the main commercial activities, namely, cattle raising, dairy farming and the production of karakul pelts. 50/

69. Namibia's agriculture has been characterized by vulnerability to floods, drought and intermittent rainfall as well as poor soil. The exception is the eastern part of Namibia, where rainfall is plentiful, enabling crops such as maize to be grown in large quantities. Throughout Namibia, the principal crops, usually grown in small garden plots, are drought-resistant grains, millet, sorghum, beans, nuts and vegetables, as well as pumpkins and melons. Very few of Namibia's staple and fresh-vegetable food crops are grown on a personal or commercial basis in sufficient quantity to supply the country. Accordingly, 50 per cent of the grain and 90 per cent of other foodstuffs are imported. 51/

70. Land distribution in Namibia is institutionalized under the apartheid system. More than 70 per cent of the best land is owned by less than 10 per cent of the population. The majority of the Namibian people are unable to own land and are relegated to 10 reserves which are characterized by poor soil, arid conditions and mountains. The white settlers and absentee landlords own farms and land which are used for export-oriented production. In addition, more than 90 per cent of the dams and boreholes in the country serve white-owned ranches and households and the water table is under constant strain by the demands of the mining sector.

71. South Africans control the marketing boards, such as the Agra Co-operative, or agencies for cattle slaughter, hide and meat processing, karakul pelts and wool and exports. 52/ South African and other foreign interests control other enterprises in the agriculture sector, such as the Gobabis/Walvis Bay meat factory and cold store owned by FNDC/Socopo, a French wholesale co-operative; a venison factory 50-per-cent owned by two West German businessmen; and an oilseed factory partly owned and managed by the South African Boere Kooperatiewe Beperk, ensuring South African monopoly on cooking oil. 53/ All of the agricultural support services, including technical expertise, credit, research, training, agricultural extension and veterinary services, agricultural inputs, stock feeds and transportation facilities, are South African-run for the benefit of the white minority.

72. Livestock farming, including cattle, sheep, and karakul, accounts for 80 to 90 per cent of the overall value of commercial agriculture. It has been severely affected, however, by the drought conditions of the past 10 years, resulting in a heavy reduction of the breeding stock, overgrazing and degradation of good-quality pasture. 54/ In spite of this, the output value of cattle and small stock rose by 50 per cent in 1987.

73. There are an estimated 1.8 million goats in Namibia. However, as with cattle, more goats are exported live to South Africa for slaughter than are processed in Namibia. Poultry and pigs are reared on a very small scale. Approximately 80 per cent of the demand for eggs and chicken meat is met from imports. In 1988, it was reported that a new breeding and production facility was being built in Namibia. 55/

Cattle

74. The national cattle herd in Namibia is estimated at 2 million head. The number of cattle marketed annually fluctuates from a high of 437,000 to an average of about 300,000. Of these, about half are slaughtered locally. The annual capacity of the Okahandja and Windhoek plants of Swavleis, the only meat-processing concern in the Territory, is 180,000 head. The Namibian beef industry is totally at the mercy of South African interests. Namibia's cattle are transported to South Africa for slaughter and processing as the needs of the South African processing companies dictate, but at great expense owing to the weight loss from shipping, loss of export earnings and subsequent idleness of the Namibian processing capacity.

75. The dairy herd in Namibia is about 5,000 head. Namibia's urban areas are supplied with fresh milk at the expense of the rural areas. The majority of dairy products are imported from South Africa. The dairy industry has been reduced by South African price and subsidy policy changes from an exporter of dairy products in the 1960s to an importer in the 1980s. 56/

Karakul

76. The Namibian karakul sheep population is about 3.5 million. In addition, there are approximately a million other sheep farmed for their wool and meat. The karakul industry in Namibia is one of the largest in the world. Approximately 1 million pelts are marketed annually under the names Persian lamb and Swakara and are used for manufacturing high-fashion fur coats. The entire production is exported: 60 per cent to the Federal Republic of Germany, 20 per cent to Italy and the balance to Japan, Canada, the United States and Spain and other countries of the European Economic Community (EEC). 57/

77. Karakul ranches number about 4,000, of which 3,000 are white-owned. The individual farmers sell their pelts through the Agra farmers' co-operative. As many as 500,000 sheep may be exported live to South Africa annually for slaughter and processing. Breeding and sales are controlled by the Government Karakul Board and overseas sales by the International Karakul Secretariat in Windhoek. Auctions are conducted four times a year in London. 58/

78. The annual wool and pelt production in Namibia contributes approximately one third of the total value of agricultural products. In 1988-1989, the heavy demand for wool caused a 60 per cent increase from the profits for the previous year. 59/ The pelts sold in London averaged $21 per pelt, a new record for 1988. The price of stock also set new records, with the price of rams averaging $385, double the 1987 price. 60/

F. Fisheries

79. One of the most devastating examples of South Africa's illegal occupation is the ravaged fishing industry. The activities of South African and other foreign economic interests in this sector have led to the large-scale depletion of Namibia's fishing grounds and to massive unemployment of Namibian workers.

80. The cold Benguela sea current, which contains large quantities of nutrients, broadens from a width of 160 kilometres at the Orange River to 240 kilometres north of Walvis Bay. This makes it one of the world's richest fishing grounds for both deep-water demersal fish which feed and live near the ocean floor; white fish such as hake and mackerel (maasbanker); and surface-feeding pelagic fish which include pilchards and anchovy. In addition, there is a flourishing rock lobster fishing ground in and around the port of Lüderitz. Data on recent fish catches are given in table 5.

Table 5. Namibian fish catches, 1982-1988

(Rounded to nearest hundred metric tons)

Variety	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988
Pilchards	49 500	42 800	55 600	52 800	49 500	62 700	59 300
Anchovy	83 600	183 400	13 700	51 100	15 500	377 300	114 800
Maasbanker/ mackerel	67 100	110 200	90 400	26 600	79 800	34 600	171 500
Total	200 200	336 400	159 700	130 500	144 800	474 600	345 600

Source: Sea Products (SWA) Ltd., The Windhoek Advertiser, 16 May 1988 and 21 December 1988; The Economist Intelligence Unit (London), Country Report No. 1, 1988, p. 21.

81. The inshore processing industry and much of the fishing fleet are in the hands of a tightly knit clique of South African companies (Ovenstone, Silverman and Du Preez), or South African-based corporate capital (Barlow Rand, Anglo-Vaal, Anglo American, Fedfood/Federale Volksbeleggings). The lobster industry is monopolized by the South West Africa Fishing Industries, Ltd. and the General Development Corporation of Namibia, Ltd., cold storage companies which are all South African owned. 61/ In addition to processing rock lobster, the two factories export live lobsters to Paris at the rate of 3 tons per week. 62/

82. Canned fish production at Walvis Bay in 1988 was 2.5 million cartons, in comparison with 1.1 million cartons packed in South Africa. Pet food production was limited to 160,000 cartons and fishmeal and fish oil production were also limited. 63/

83. In 1988, three Windhoek-based marketing companies originally established by the South West Africa/Namibia Pelagic Fishing concessionaires had a turnover of R 182.7 million, an increase of over 26 per cent from the previous year. Of this, fish-meal accounted for R 100 million, pilchards R 72.5 million and fish oil R 10.2 million. 64/

84. South African owned or controlled companies still dominate, with more than 80 per cent of the pelagic fishing rights, in spite of a reduction of the South African share of allowable pilchard catches from 91 per cent to 66 per cent. 65/ All the pelagic fish catches are loaded and processed at the United Fishing Enterprises in Walvis Bay.

85. At present, fishing in the offshore waters of Namibia is regulated by the International Commission for South-East Atlantic Fisheries (ICSEAF) and the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT). In view of the early accession of the United Nations Council for Namibia to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and of the Council's decision mentioned above, the Council expects members of ICSEAF and ICCAT to conduct their operations with due regard to its decisions and to the interests of the people of Namibia.

86. Namibia's marine resources continue to be depleted for quick profit by the heedless overfishing of South African and other foreign economic interests, which have ignored warnings on the need to protect this vital national resource. The future of the fishing industry is further aggravated by the apartheid régime's illegal attempts to maintain control over the Territory's marine wealth and fishing industry and to continue, even after Namibia's independence, its colonial occupation of Walvis Bay, which is the centre of the industry, as well as to deny Namibia its right to an exclusive economic zone.

87. South Africa's illegal annexation of Walvis Bay in 1977 was condemned by the international community. The Security Council, by its resolution 432 (1978) of 27 July 1978, declared that the territorial integrity and unity of Namibia must be assured through the reintegration of Walvis Bay within the Territory. By its resolution 32/9 D of 4 November 1977, the General Assembly declared that South Africa's decision to annex Walvis Bay was an act of colonial expansion in violation of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960; that such annexation was illegal, null and void; and that Walvis Bay was an integral part of Namibia with which it was inextricably linked by geographical, historical, cultural and ethnic bonds.

II. EXPLOITATION OF LABOUR

88. Human resource development in Namibia has been systematically and routinely undermined, not only at the education level but especially at the labour level. The apartheid policies of "job reservation", coupled with the migrant labour system, have ensured an adequate supply of cheap unskilled labour for the white-run economy. Confinement of Namibians to homelands where there are no industries and where farming is not viable has ensured a reservoir of cheap labour for the contract labour system utilized by the foreign economic interests in Namibia. On

the farms, Namibians are used for manual labour and paid mostly with goods in kind. Most Namibian workers do not have the right to choose their jobs, employers and places of residence or to live with their families. They have no legal protection against maltreatment, nor do they have opportunities for training or promotion. The breakdown of the labour force in Namibia by economic activity is shown in table 6.

Table 6. Work-force in Namibia by economic sector

Sector	Blacks	Coloureds	Whites	Total	Percentage
Small agriculture	230 000	10 000	..	240 000	50.3
Large agriculture	43 500	6 500	6 500	56 500	11.8
Fishing and fish processing	5 000	2 000	500	7 000	1.6
Mining	18 000	1 000	3 500	22 500	4.7
Manufacturing and public utilities	7 250	2 500	2 750	12 500	2.6
Construction	10 000	2 500	1 750	15 000	3.2
Transport and communication	10 000	1 500	1 000	12 500	2.6
Commerce and finance	17 000	3 000	5 000	25 000	5.2
Government	11 500	3 500	15 000	30 000	6.3
Domestic service	29 000	6 000	..	35 000	7.3
Others a/	17 000	3 500	500	21 000	4.4
Total	398 250	42 000	36 500	477 500	100

Source: R. H. Green, Manpower Estimates and Development Implications for Namibia (Lusaka, United Nations Institute for Namibia, 1978); W. van Ginneken, Incomes and Wages in Namibia (Geneva, International Labour Organisation, 1985).

a/ Includes an estimated 17,500 urban unemployed self-employed.

89. Safety conditions in the work-place continue to be a serious problem for Namibian workers. In addition to exploiting Namibia's human resources, the mines have tended to operate without regard to health or environmental concerns. Uranium, copper and lead mining and arsenic production adversely affect the health of workers and their families, owing to air and ground-water pollution and the degradation of the landscape. In addition, workers who wear their dust-contaminated clothing at home endanger their families. Some of the health hazards associated with mining and minerals in Namibia are rated in table 7.

Table 7. Health hazards associated with minerals and mining in Namibia

Mineral	Place	Health hazard
Uranium	Rössing	Kidney and liver diseases, cancer and leukaemia, chemical pneumonia
Lead	Tsumeb, Kombat, Berg Aukas, Rosh Pinah	Acute poisoning symptoms including headache, weakness, loss of appetite, nausea, anaemia, joint pain, fertility problems
Copper	Tsumeb, Kombat, Klein Aub, Oamites	Skin problems, cataracts, possibly kidney and liver diseases, anaemia
Silver	Tsumeb	Chronic bronchitis, loss of night vision, kidney and lung diseases
Zinc	Tsumeb, Berg Aukas, Rosh Pinah	Skin inflammation, lung disease
Vanadium	Berg Aukas	Chronic bronchitis, lung cancer, anaemia, damage to nervous system and kidneys, asthma, hives, intestinal problems
Lithium	Karibib	Dust highly irritant to nose, eyes, lungs and skin, toxic to kidneys
Tungsten	Kranzberg, Brandberg West	Severe lung fibrosis
Tin	Uis, Brandberg West	Skin sensitization, dermatitis, hives, kidney and lung diseases

Source: Namibia: Perspectives for National Reconstruction and Development (Lusaka, United Nations Institute for Namibia, 1986), p. 948.

90. The membership of the National Union of Namibia Workers (NUNW) rose from 32,000 for the period 1986-1987 to an estimated 40,000 in 1988. Its affiliates include the Namibia Food and Allied Workers' Union (NAFAU), the Metal and Allied Namibian Workers' Union (MANWU), the Namibia Public Workers' Union (NAPWU) and the Mineworkers' Union of Namibia (MUN).

91. In 1988, activities centred around the "Living Wage Campaign" and included the avoiding of a strike over the length of shifts at the newly opened Okorusu fluorspar mine. In addition, an agreement concerning wages and working conditions was signed with Consolidated Diamond Mines (CDM) on 14 December. Rössing Uranium signed a recognition agreement with MUN endorsing collective bargaining, freedom of association and dispute procedures. Lalandil, a large employer in the seasonal crayfish industry in Lüderitz, reached agreement with NAFAU on wages and conditions of employment for seasonal fisheries and factory workers. 66/ Another Lüderitz firm, SWAFIL, signed a recognition agreement with NAFAU but did not resolve issues of transport, job security and pensions. 67/ Further information on the labour situation and recent trade union activity in Namibia is contained in the report of Standing Committee II on social conditions in Namibia (A/AC.131/312).

Notes

1/ Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1966), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 16.

2/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 24 (A/35/24), vol. I, annex II.

3/ Report on the Commission of Enquiry into SWA Affairs (Pretoria Government Printers, 1964) by F. H. Odendaal, Chairman.

4/ Namibia: Perspectives for National Reconstruction and Development (Lusaka, United Nations Institute for Namibia, 1986), p. 65.

5/ Ibid., pp. 17-19.

6/ Country Profile: Namibia 1988-89 (London, The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1985), p. 25.

7/ Ibid., p. 29.

8/ Namibia: Perspectives for National Reconstruction ..., p. 455.

9/ Ibid., p. 293.

10/ Financial Mail (Johannesburg), CDMs New Project, 16 December 1988.

11/ International Newsbriefing on Namibia (London, Namibia Support Committee), No. 62, September 1988.

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12/ Mining Annual Review 1988 (London, Mining Journal, Ltd., June 1988); Country report: Southern Africa, Namibia, p. 380.

13/ Namibia: Perspectives for National Reconstruction ..., pp. 302 and 469; The Windhoek Advertiser, 7 March 1989.

14/ Namibia: Perspectives for National Reconstruction ..., p. 302.

15/ Country Report: Namibia, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland (London, The Economist Intelligence Unit), No. 3, 1988, p. 22; Country Profile: Namibia 1988-89 ..., p. 25.

16/ The Windhoek Advertiser, 6 March 1986.

17/ The Guardian (London), 29 September 1987; see also Africa Research Bulletin, vol. 24, No. 10, 30 November 1987, p. 880.

18/ Financial Times (London), 17 August 1988.

19/ Country Profile: Namibia 1988-89 ..., pp. 25 and 26.

20/ Mines and Independence (London, Catholic Institute for International Relations, 1983), pp. 49, 50 and 52; Namibia: Perspectives for National Reconstruction ..., p. 302.

21/ Financial Times (London), 8 October 1988.

22/ The Windhoek Advertiser, 3 March 1989.

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24/ The Namib Times, 20 December 1985.

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26/ Ibid., 12 April 1989.

27/ Mines and Independence ..., p. 37; Mining Annual Review 1988 ..., p. 380.

28/ Country Profile: Namibia 1987-88 (London, The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1987), p. 23.

29/ The New York Times, 2 November 1988.

30/ The Windhoek Advertiser, 27 June 1986.

31/ Namibia: Perspectives for National Reconstruction ..., p. 304.

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32/ Alun Roberts, The Rössing File (London, Namibia Support Committee, 1980), pp. 52 and 53.

33/ Michael C. Lunch and Thomas L. Neff, The Political Economy of African Uranium and Its Role in International Markets (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Energy Laboratory, working paper No. MIT-EL 82-006, July 1982), p. 35.

34/ The Windhoek Advertiser, 11 April 1988.

35/ The Observer (London), 11 October 1987; see also South Scan (London), 30 October 1987.

36/ Country Profile: Namibia 1987-88 ..., p. 26.

37/ South Group (London), 26 October 1988.

38/ International Newsbriefing on Namibia ..., August 1987; Financial Mail (Johannesburg), 22 May 1987; The Windhoek Advertiser, 6 January 1988.

39/ The Windhoek Advertiser, 31 May 1988.

40/ Ibid., 14 December 1988.

41/ Namibia: Perspectives for National Reconstruction ..., pp. 377 and 378.

42/ The Windhoek Advertiser, 10 February 1988.

43/ Country Profile: Namibia 1987-88 ..., p. 35; The Windhoek Advertiser, 24 November 1986 and 26 November 1987.

44/ Namibia: Perspectives for National Reconstruction ..., p. 482.

45/ Ibid., p. 721.

46/ Country Profile: Namibia 1988-89 ..., p. 30.

47/ Namibia: Perspectives for National Reconstruction ..., p. 338.

48/ Financial Mail (Johannesburg), 16 September 1988.

49/ Ibid., 19 August 1988.

50/ Namibia: Perspectives for National Reconstruction ..., pp. 112 and 113.

51/ Ibid., p. 113; The Windhoek Advertiser, 10 March 1985, 15 June 1988 and 2 November 1988.

52/ Country Profile: Namibia 1988-89 ..., p. 22.

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54/ Country Profile: Namibia 1987-88 ..., p. 19.

55/ The Windhoek Advertiser, 11 May 1988.

56/ Namibia: Perspectives for National Reconstruction ..., pp. 118 and 119.

57/ Ibid., pp. 121 and 122.

58/ Country Profile: Namibia 1988-89 ..., p. 20; Namibia: Perspectives for National Reconstruction ..., p. 121.

59/ The Windhoek Advertiser, 16 August 1988.

60/ Ibid., 30 May 1988.

61/ The Namibian (Windhoek), 30 September 1988.

62/ The Windhoek Advertiser, 2 November 1988.

63/ Ibid., 19 September 1988.

64/ Ibid., 9 March 1989; Financial Mail (Johannesburg), 6 January 1989.

65/ Country Profile: Namibia 1988-89 ..., p. 23.

66/ The Namibian (Windhoek), 21 October 1988; International Newsbriefing on Namibia ..., No. 64, November 1988.

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Annex I

OUTPUT, VALUE AND USE OF SELECTED NAMIBIAN MINERALS

(In metric tons, for the year 1987, unless otherwise stated)

Mineral or ore	Mine or area	Output	Unit value	Typical use
		A. Precious metals		
Gold	Navachab, by-product from other mines	172 kg	$446/oz	Jewellery, coins, electronics, dentistry
Silver	Oamites, Klein Aub	60	$5-$11/oz	Photography, electronics, silverware, brazing alloys and solders, jewellery, coins
		B. Older major metals		
Copper	Tsumeb, a/ Oamites, Klein Aub (closed 1987), Matchless (closed 1983)	37,700 (blister) 122,500 (concentrate)	$0.70-$0.95/lb	Electrical wire, plumbing
Lead	Tsumeb, a/ Rosh Pinah, Berg Aukas (closed)	40,600 (refined) 75,100 (concentrate)	$35.9/lb	Batteries, petroleum additives
Zinc	Tsumeb, Rosh Pinah	70,200 (concentrate)	$1,000/ton	Metal coatings, building construction, batteries, pigments
Tin	Uis, Tin Tan, Brandberg West (closed)	1,097	$8,200/ton	Tinplate, bronze solder, chemicals, foil

Mineral or ore	Mine or area	Output	Unit value	Typical use
		C. Chemical metals and minerals		
Fluorspar b/	Okorusu	55,000 (projected capacity)	$70-$115/ton	Aluminium, steel and chemical industries
Salt	Salt pans on coast	124,000 (including Walvis Bay)		Table salt, chlorine and caustic soda, road de-icing, salt ash
Lithium	..	3,100	$0.85-$0.95/lb	Glass, ceramics, lubricating grease, synthetic rubber, batteries, aerospace industry, fuel cells, nuclear weapons
Bismuth (by-product of copper and lead	-	-	$2.25-$3.50/lb	Pharmaceuticals, catalysts, cosmetics, pigments, electronics
Antimony	..	51	$1.05-$1.18/lb	Armaments, automobiles, batteries, cable coverings, pipes, flame retardants
		D. Steel industry metals		
Tungsten (from scheelite and wolframite)	Brandberg West, Krantzberg (both closed)	100 (1980)	$32-$65 (concentrate)	Armaments, steel

Mineral or ore	Mine or area	Output	Unit value	Typical use
Vanadium (by-product in processing uranium ores)	Berg Aukas (closed)	462 (1978)		Pipelines, pressure vessels, bridges, highways, reinforcing bars, forgings and tool steels, aircraft, sulphuric acid, vulcanized rubber
Niobium	Rössing	..	$2.25/lb (columbite) $260/lb (pyrochlore)	Power and transportation, cutting tools, chemical processing, anti-corrosives, nuclear fuel-element cladding, optics
Molybdenum (by-product of copper)	Tsumeb a/		$2.89-$3.75/lb	Aerospace, offshore oil and gas, automobiles, ship-building, alloys, catalysts, lubricants, pigments
Manganese	Otjosondu	..	$330-$430/ton	Ferrous alloys
		E. Nuclear metals		
Uranium	Rössing	4,200	$19/lb ($U_3$)	Nuclear fuel
Beryllium (from beryl and bertrandite)	..	..	$65-$282/lb (different grades)	Nuclear reactors, aerospace, electrical equipment

Mineral or ore	Mine or area	Output	Unit value	Typical use
Caesium (by-product of lithium)	..	..	$330/lb	Photoelectric cells, photomultiplier tubes, scintillation counters, petrochemicals, pharmaceuticals, power generation
Rare earths (by-product of uranium)	..	..	$55-$85/lb.	Cathode ray and fluorescent tubes, petroleum catalysts, metallurgy, ceramics, glass, phosphors, electronics, nuclear research
F. Electronic metals and minerals				
Cadmium (by-product of zinc)	Tsumeb, a/ Rosh Pinah, Berg Aukas (closed)	51	$5-$10/lb	Anti-corrosion plating, batteries, pigments, plastics, alloys
Gallium	Tsumeb a/	..	$280-$400/kg	Infra-red imaging, fibre optics, catalysts
Germanium	Tsumeb a/	(Namibia is estimated to have half of world reserves)	$600-$784/kg	Semi-conductors
Selenium (by-product of copper)	..	..	$8-$12/lb	Photoreceptors, semi-conductors, glass, metallurgy, chemicals

Mineral or ore	Mine or area	Output	Unit value	Typical use
Tellurium (by-product of copper, lead and gold)	..	..	$15/lb	Photoreceptor alloys, infrared and photovoltaic-devices
Tantalum	Tantalite Valley Minerals		$17-$28/lb	Electronic capacitors, chemical equipment, cemented carbides, super alloys
Indium (by-product of zinc, lead, tin, copper)	..	..	$100-$300/kg	Bearings, transparent electrodes, non-corrosive metals (marine)
Rhenium (by-product of copper, molybdenum)	..	..	$550-$2,000/kg	Lead-free high-octane petrol, high-temperature applications, electronics
		G. Gemstones		
Diamonds	Consolidated Diamond	1 million carats	$6-$300/ct	Jewellery, industrial saws, drill-bits and abrasives

Source: Mining Annual Review 1988 (London), pp. 13-119; Namibia: Perspectives for National Reconstruction and Development (Lusaka, United Nations Institute for Namibia, 1986), pp. 307-315; Catholic Institute for International Relations (London), Mines and Independence, pp. 31 and 32.

a/ Tsumeb Corporation mines include: Tsumeb mine, Asis East, Asis West, Kombat, Matchless and Otjihuse.

b/ Total output for the continent of Africa in 1987 was 500,000 tonnes.

Annex II

TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS WITH INTERESTS IN COMPANIES IN NAMIBIA

Canada

Varity Corporation
Rio Algom Ltd.

France

Française des Pétroles SA, Cie

Germany, Federal Republic of

Metallgesellschaft AG

Netherlands

The Royal Dutch Petroleum Company

South Africa

Anglo American Corporation of South Africa
Anglovaal Limited
Bank Holding Corporation of South Africa, Ltd.
Barlow Rand, Ltd.
De Beers Consolidated Mines, Ltd.
Diamond Mining and Utility Co. (SWA), Ltd.
Edward L. Bateman, Ltd.
Electricity Supply Commission (ESCOM)
Federale Mynbou Beperk
Federale Volksbeleggings Beperk
General Mining Union Corporation
Gold Fields of South Africa, Ltd.
Haggie Limited
Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa
Industrial Diamonds of South Africa (1945), Ltd.
Iron and Steel Corporation (ISCOR)
Johannesburg Consolidated Investments
Kaap-Kunene Beleggings Bpk
Marine Products, Ltd.
Murray and Roberts Holdings Ltd.
Nedbank Group, Ltd.
Ovenstone Investments, Ltd.
Protea Holdings, Ltd.
S.A. Manganese Amcor, Ltd.
Sentrachem, Ltd.
South African Coal, Oil and Gas Corporation, Ltd.
South African Marine Corporation

South Africa (continued)

South African Railways and Harbours Corporation
Southern Oil Exploration Corporation (Pty.), Ltd.
Stewarts and Lloyds of South Africa, Ltd.
Suiderland Development Corporation
Television and Electrical Holdings, Ltd.
The Messina (Transvaal) Development Co.
The Trust Bank
Tiger Oats and National Milling Co., Ltd.
Trade and Industry Acceptance Corporation, Ltd.
Volkskas Group, Ltd.

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Acrow Limited
B.A.T. Industries Group
Beecham Group PLC
Blackwood Hodge PLC
The Boc Group PLC
C.T. Bowring and Co., Ltd.
British Petroleum Co. PLC
Bush Boake Allen, Ltd.
Commercial Union Assurance Co. PLC
Consolidated Gold Fields PLC
Delta Group PLC
The Distillers Company PLC
General Electric Company PLC
Grand Metropolitan PLC
Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance PLC
Lonrho PLC
Northern Engineering Industries PLC
Norwich Union Insurance Group
Rio Tinto Zinc Corporation
Royal Insurance PLC
STC International Computers, Ltd.
Sedgwick Group PLC
The Shell Transport and Trading Company
The 600 Group Ltd.
Smith Industries, Ltd.
Sun Alliance and London Insurance PLC

United States of America

American Cyanamid Company
Caltex Petroleum Corporation
Dresser Industries, Inc.
The Interpublic Group of Companies
Johnson and Johnson Co.
Joy Manufacturing Corporation

United States of America (continued)

Mobil Corporation
Phelps Dodge Corporation
Sears Roebuck and Company
Standard Oil Co. (SOHIO)
Tenneco, Inc.

Source: E/C.10/AC.4/1989/8, table 3.

Annex III

MAP OF NAMIBIA'S PRINCIPAL MINES AND MINERALS



UNITED NATIONS

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UNITED NATIONS COUNCIL FOR NAMIBIA

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS RELATED TO NAMIBIA

Report of Standing Committee II

Chairman: Mr. Shaukat UMER (Pakistan)

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INTRODUCTION

1. In 1966, the General Assembly, by its resolution 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966, terminated South Africa's Mandate over South West Africa (subsequently called Namibia) and assumed direct responsibility for the Territory. In 1967, by its resolution 2248 (S-V) of 19 May 1967, the Assembly established the United Nations Council for Namibia as the legal Administering Authority for Namibia until independence and entrusted it with the responsibility of defending the rights and interests of the Territory and its people.

2. Since then, the Council has made a sustained effort to secure the withdrawal of the illegal South African administration from the Territory so that the people of Namibia could exercise their inalienable right to self-determination, freedom and national independence.

3. The Namibian people, under the leadership of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), their sole and authentic representative, have demonstrated their unswerving determination to gain genuine independence for their country despite the repressive measures imposed by the racist régime of South Africa and the atrocities committed by its illegal occupation forces. Over the years, the struggle of the Namibian people, led by SWAPO, has been intensified and has received increased support from the international community.

4. During the period under review, negotiations between Angola, Cuba and South Africa, mediated by the United States of America, to bring peace to the south-western region of Africa were first held in London in May 1988 and subsequently in Cairo, Geneva, New York and Brazzaville. The process was completed by the signing at United Nations Headquarters on 22 December 1988 of two accords. The first, a tripartite agreement between Angola, Cuba and South Africa, formalized the commitments made by the three countries at Brazzaville on 13 December to independence for Namibia on the basis of Security Council resolution 435 (1978) of 29 September 1978. 1/ The second, a bilateral treaty signed between Angola and Cuba, referred to the timetable and verification arrangement of the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. 2/ In their tripartite agreement, Angola, Cuba and South Africa proposed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations that implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978) commence on 1 April 1989 (see paras. 47-61).

5. The present report updates the most recent report of the Council on political developments related to Namibia (A/AC.131/284) up to 1 April 1989, the date set for the implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978).

I. THE SITUATION IN NAMIBIA

A. General

6. In its previous reports (A/AC.131/186 and A/AC.131/284), the Council reviewed the political evolution of the question of Namibia. The review highlighted, inter alia, the termination of South Africa's Mandate over Namibia and the assumption of direct responsibility for the Territory by the United Nations; the establishment of the United Nations Council for Namibia as the legal Administering Authority for the Territory until independence; the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 21 June 1971, 3/ by which the Court declared that the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia was illegal and that South Africa was under obligation to withdraw from Namibia; the status of SWAPO as the sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people; the legitimacy of the struggle of the people of Namibia for self-determination and national independence by all means at their disposal, including armed struggle; the acceptance of the United Nations plan for the independence of Namibia, contained in Security Council resolutions 385 (1976) of 30 January 1976 and 435 (1978), as the only basis for a peaceful settlement of the Namibian question; the unanimous rejection by the international community of the "linkage" between the independence of Namibia and the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola; and the condemnation and rejection of South Africa's continued attempts to circumvent the United Nations plan for Namibia through the imposition of puppet institutions, including in particular Pretoria's installation on 17 June 1985 of a so-called "interim government" in Namibia.

7. During the period under review, the racist régime of South Africa continued to attempt to subjugate the Namibian people. Its apartheid policies continued to be extended to all aspects of the life of the population of the Territory. The South African régime also increased its militarization of Namibia and its acts of brutality and oppression of the Namibian people. Disappearances and detentions of members of SWAPO and of its supporters and sympathizers were stepped up and cold-blooded murders were widespread. The state of emergency, martial law and dusk-to-dawn curfew in Namibia were enforced by the Pretoria régime's imposition of so-called security zones, covering more than two thirds of the Territory, with the aim of suppressing the struggle of the Namibian people for freedom and independence.

B. Continued illegal occupation of the Territory by South Africa

8. During the period under review, the racist régime continued to deny the Namibian people their inalienable right to self-determination and national independence. At the same time, Pretoria continued to escalate its attempts to suppress all resistance to its illegal occupation. Ruthless political repression, racial discrimination and apartheid and other gross violations of human rights, as well as economic exploitation by South Africa and other foreign economic interests, continued to characterize Pretoria's illegal occupation of Namibia.

9. South Africa maintained its illegal occupation of the Territory mainly through its huge military machine, its police apparatus and a series of repressive laws and proclamations which it has enacted over the years, as well as through the support it receives from certain Western and other States.

10. Namibia remained occupied by a massive South African colonial army of over 100,000 troops which turned the Territory into a garrison state. The northern part of Namibia had been under a state of emergency since 1972 and more than half the country had been under martial law since 1979.

11. The racist occupation régime increased its military buildup, its recruitment and training of Namibians for tribal armies and its use of mercenaries to carry out its policy of repression of the Namibian people and their legitimate aspirations. It also introduced compulsory military conscription of all Namibian males between 17 and 55 years of age and carried out forcible and massive displacement of Namibians from their homes for military purposes.

12. The state of war and repression brought about by the illegal South African occupation régime continued to force thousands of Namibians to flee their native land in order to seek refuge in neighbouring countries, particularly Angola and Zambia. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that there were 70,000 to 80,000 Namibian refugees in Angola, Zambia and other neighbouring countries. 4/

13. The South African military repeatedly used the Territory of Namibia to carry out large-scale invasions and acts of aggression against Angola where the targets of its attacks were Namibian refugees and Angolan civilians, many of whom were killed or injured and others abducted and forcibly taken to Namibia. Moreover, these raids caused tremendous loss of life and damage to property in Angola.

14. As Namibian resistance to South Africa's illegal occupation grew in strength and intensity, the racist régime extended further its repressive legislation and security apparatus to cover an extremely wide range of "offences". Such apartheid laws and illegal proclamations were used to suppress political activity and to harass or victimize those who dared to confront or oppose the occupation régime.

15. These repressive laws and powers of arbitrary detention were enacted in an attempt to crush the national liberation struggle waged by SWAPO for self-determination and national independence. Under these laws, the South African authorities carried out mass arrests and held many SWAPO members and supporters without trial because of their opposition to the illegal occupation of their country.

16. In defiance of the repeated calls of the international community, Pretoria continued to impose in Namibia many inhuman measures, such as arbitrary imprisonment and detention without trial and wanton beatings and torture of innocent Namibians. There were also numerous cases of "disappearances" and extrajudicial executions.

17. The majority of detentions and other inhuman practices of the illegal South African forces occurred within the so-called "operational area" of northern Namibia. Large numbers of civilians were detained for interrogation about SWAPO and its activities inside the Territory.

18. Information on specific cases of harassment, repression, imprisonment and murder is contained in the report of Standing Committee II on social conditions in Namibia (A/AC.131/312).

C. Struggle of the Namibian people for national liberation

19. The resistance of the Namibian people to foreign domination dates back to the first days of colonization of the Territory by Imperial Germany in the 1880s. It took an organized form in 1960 with the founding of SWAPO, the vanguard liberation movement whose firm commitment to the total liberation of Namibia earned it recognition by the international community as the sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people.

20. SWAPO was born out of bitter experiences of the most brutal, inhuman, racist and exploitative conditions suffered by the Namibian people as a result of colonialism and foreign domination. Its foundation was also inspired by various forms of anti-colonial resistance by the Namibian people since the first days of colonization of the Territory. From the very beginning, SWAPO assumed the duty of providing forthright and unwavering leadership to the oppressed population of Namibia in its struggle against colonial subjugation by the racist régime of South Africa.

21. After analysing the prevailing social, economic and political conditions in Namibia and the imperative need for change, SWAPO mobilized the broad masses of the Namibian people for a sustained multifaceted struggle against South Africa's illegal occupation and for the attainment of self-determination and national independence.

22. Politically, SWAPO intensified its mass mobilization and organization of the population of the Territory in opposing racist South Africa's colonial presence in Namibia. Despite widespread repression of SWAPO members and supporters by the Pretoria régime, the liberation movement successfully united the Namibian people, whose clear stand for genuine independence frustrated South Africa's attempts to impose a neo-colonialist settlement on the basis of bogus, puppet institutions such as the so-called "interim government".

23. SWAPO, for its part, remained committed to the implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978) as the only internationally accepted basis for bringing about Namibia's independence through peaceful means. To this end, it declared, on several occasions, its readiness to sign a cease-fire agreement with the Pretoria régime as the first step in implementing the United Nations plan for the independence of Namibia.

24. In addition to its activities of political mobilization, SWAPO intensified the liberation struggle on the military front. The launching in August 1966 of the armed struggle by the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), the military wing of SWAPO, marked a watershed in the history of the struggling people of Namibia. The decision to take up arms was born out of the conviction that the responsibility of liberating their motherland lay with the Namibian people themselves.

25. As the armed struggle intensified, racist South Africa was forced to move into Namibia more than 100,000 troops, as well as mercenaries, murder squads and other hirelings who were locked in a battle that they were not able to win. Throughout 1987, PLAN launched numerous attacks on South African military bases, resulting in the killing of South African troops, damage to vital installations and destruction of communication and supply facilities. PLAN also ambushed South African convoys and troops in the field, capturing large quantities of war matériel, and shot down a number of military aircraft.

26. Apart from providing political leadership to the people of Namibia at home and abroad, SWAPO also worked hard, with the support of the international community, to provide for the needs of Namibian refugees and to create a basis for nation-building in preparation for an independent Namibia. It organized health and education centres in the front-line States, particularly in Angola and Zambia, where Namibians in exile received health care, education and other basic services. It also played an integral role in the execution of training, education and development programmes sponsored by the United Nations and its specialized agencies. SWAPO thus recognized that, while the immediate objective of the struggle was to liberate the Territory from colonial occupation, there was a need to prepare Namibians through formal education and practical experience for the task of reconstructing their country after independence.

27. Given the intransigence on the part of racist South Africa and the support given to it by the United States Administration in its delaying tactics, SWAPO made it clear that it would intensify the struggle for national liberation and independence on all fronts until final victory was achieved in Namibia. The United Nations supported the legitimate struggle of the Namibian people and upheld their right to use all means at their disposal, including armed struggle, in pursuit of their inalienable right to self-determination and national independence.

28. As the conflict in Namibia intensified and repression by the racist occupation forces became ever more ruthless, SWAPO and the people of Namibia came to need increased political, material and moral assistance from all possible sources. It remained the task of the United Nations and the international community at large to furnish such assistance until the day when the people of the Territory were able to determine their own future in a genuinely independent and united Namibia.

29. Information on the armed struggle of the Namibian people for national liberation and independence is contained in the report of Standing Committee II on the military situation in and relating to Namibia (A/AC.131/311).

II. ACTION BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IN SUPPORT OF THE INDEPENDENCE OF NAMIBIA

A. General Assembly

30. During the general debate at the forty-third session of the General Assembly, there was unanimous support for the independence of Namibia on the basis of the United Nations settlement plan endorsed by Security Council resolution 435 (1978). In this connection, many delegations observed that new hope was injected into the Namibian situation in May 1988 by the initiation of talks between Angola, Cuba and South Africa, with the United States as mediator. They noted that subsequent meetings held in New York in July had led to an agreement between the parties on a set of essential principles to establish the basis for peace in the south-western region of Africa. 5/

31. Delegations expressed support for the ongoing negotiation which they believed would facilitate a peaceful settlement of the Namibian situation on the basis of Security Council resolution 435 (1978). They reiterated their conviction that the settlement plan endorsed by resolution 435 (1978) offered the only internationally accepted basis for the achievement of independence by Namibia. They also stressed that although South Africa was a party to the talks and had entered into certain agreements the international community must heighten its vigilance in view of Pretoria's record in Namibia and its past failure to keep its word with respect to implementing United Nations resolutions.

32. At its 54th plenary meeting, on 17 November 1988, the General Assembly adopted resolutions 43/26 A to E on the question of Namibia. By resolution 43/26 A entitled "Situation in Namibia resulting from the illegal occupation of the Territory by South Africa", the Assembly reaffirmed the inalienable right of the people of Namibia to self-determination, freedom and national independence in a united Namibia, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and as recognized by the General Assembly in its resolutions 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 and 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966 and in subsequent resolutions of the Assembly relating to Namibia; strongly condemned the South African régime for its continued illegal occupation of Namibia in defiance of the resolutions of the United Nations relating to Namibia; reaffirmed its decision that the United Nations Council for Namibia, in pursuance of its mandate, should proceed to establish its administration in Namibia with a view to terminating racist South Africa's illegal occupation of the Territory; solemnly reaffirmed that Namibia's independence must be with its territorial integrity intact, including Walvis Bay, the Penguin Islands and other offshore islands, and reiterated that, in accordance with the resolutions of the United Nations, any attempt by South Africa to annex them was, therefore, illegal, null and void; and strongly condemned South Africa for obstructing the implementation of the resolutions of the United Nations, in particular Security Council resolutions 385 (1976), 435 (1978), 439 (1978) of 13 November 1978, 532 (1983) of 31 May 1983, 539 (1983) of 28 October 1983, 566 (1985) of 19 June 1985 and 601 (1987) of 30 October 1987, and for its manoeuvres, in contravention of those resolutions, designed to consolidate its colonial and neo-colonial interests at the expense of the legitimate aspirations of the Namibian people for genuine self-determination, freedom and national independence in a united Namibia.

33. By its resolution 43/26 B, entitled "Implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978)", the General Assembly strongly condemned racist South Africa for obstructing the implementation of Security Council resolutions 385 (1976), 435 (1978), 439 (1978), 532 (1983), 539 (1983), 566 (1985) and 601 (1987); demanded that South Africa urgently comply fully and unconditionally with the resolutions of the Security Council, in particular resolutions 385 (1976) and 435 (1978) and subsequent resolutions of the Council relating to Namibia; emphasized once again that the only parties to the conflict in Namibia were, on the one hand, the Namibian people represented by SWAPO, their sole and authentic representative, and, on the other, the racist régime of South Africa which illegally occupies the Territory; and noted with satisfaction the statement by the Security Council on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the adoption of resolution 435 (1978) in which the members of the Council, inter alia, strongly urged South Africa to comply forthwith with the resolutions and decisions of the Security Council, particularly resolution 435 (1978), and to co-operate with the Secretary-General in its immediate, full and definitive implementation.

34. By its resolutions 43/26 C, D and E, the General Assembly approved the programme of work of the United Nations Council for Namibia, the guidelines for dissemination of information and mobilization of international public opinion in support of the immediate independence of Namibia and for the United Nations Fund for Namibia, respectively.

B. Intergovernmental bodies

35. The question of Namibia and the situation in southern Africa were subjects of intense concern and debate during the meetings of several intergovernmental bodies which adopted important decisions and resolutions on the question of Namibia in order to advance the efforts of the international community on behalf of Namibia's early transition to independence on the basis of Security Council resolution 435 (1978).

1. Organization of African Unity

36. During the period under review, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa held its forty-ninth ordinary session at Arusha, United Republic of Tanzania, from 18 to 20 February 1988, its fiftieth at Harare from 13 to 16 May 1988 and its fifty-first at Tripoli from 13 to 15 February 1989. The question of Namibia continued to be an item of great concern and deliberation at these meetings. After consideration of the question in depth at each of its meetings, the Liberation Committee adopted resolutions on Namibia which were submitted to the appropriate session of the OAU Council of Ministers.

37. At the conclusion of its fiftieth ordinary session, the Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa also adopted the Harare Declaration on the Total Decolonization of Africa and the Elimination of Apartheid (CM/1492 (XLVIII), annex II). By that Declaration, the Committee stated, inter alia, that in spite of

all diplomatic efforts by OAU, the United Nations, the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and SWAPO, the implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978) remained at an impasse. For almost seven years the Reagan Administration had blocked Namibia's independence by introducing the irrelevant and extraneous concept of "linkage", which the Pretoria régime gleefully embraced. The Pretoria régime was further strengthened in its intransigence and defiance by collusion with the United States, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Federal Republic of Germany and Japan.

38. The Declaration called for renewed efforts on the part of OAU member States and the international community in order to secure the immediate implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978). It expressed support for Angola's recent initiative to bring peace to the south-western region of Africa and independence for Namibia within the context of the resolution. It called upon OAU member States to continue condemning the installation of puppet institutions and the holding of ethnic elections in Namibia against the will and aspirations of the Namibian people; reiterated its unflagging and abiding commitment to the total liberation of Africa; and called upon all member States to implement faithfully the measure specified therein.

39. At the conclusion of its forty-eighth ordinary session, held at Addis Ababa from 19 to 23 May 1988, the Council of Ministers adopted resolution CM/Res.1147 (XLVIII) on Namibia, by which it, inter alia, strongly condemned Pretoria's latest schemes of imposing tribal elections on the Namibian people against their will and in defiance of the decisions of the United Nations; reiterated the continued validity of resolution 435 (1978) as the legal basis for international consensus on the independence of Namibia; called upon the OAU Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa to continue to undertake periodic consultations with the SWAPO leadership in order to apprise itself of progress at the war front and to assess the material needs of PLAN combatants with the purpose of reporting back such needs to the next summit meeting; expressed firmly the Organization's unshakeable commitment to the previous decisions and resolutions on Namibia adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, and unswerving support for Security Council resolution 435 (1978) and General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples; and encouraged the United Nations Council for Namibia, in fulfilment of the mandate entrusted to it more than 20 years previously, to take all the necessary steps, in co-operation with SWAPO and OAU, to establish itself in Namibia in order to organize the transition process and to hand over power to the Namibian people, on the basis of their freely and democratically expressed wishes.

40. The twenty-fourth ordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of OAU, held at Addis Ababa from 25 to 28 May 1988, adopted the Addis Ababa Declaration on the Occasion of the Twenty-fifth Anniversary of OAU, 6/ by which they, inter alia, declared unity, solidarity, liberation and development as the guiding philosophy of their actions for the next two decades; reaffirmed their determination to eradicate the last vestiges of colonialism from Africa; expressed their determination to achieve early independence for Namibia and to secure the total eradication of apartheid in South Africa; reaffirmed the primacy of the armed

struggle and resolved to increase financial, material and military assistance to the national liberation movements - the African National Congress of South Africa (ANC), the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC) and SWAPO - to enable them to intensify the armed struggle; committed themselves to the imposition of comprehensive and mandatory sanctions against the apartheid régime of South Africa and urged the international community to support the imposition of such sanctions; and appealed for increased mobilization by the international community in the application of Security Council resolution 435 (1978).

41. At the conclusion of its forty-ninth ordinary session, held at Addis Ababa from 20 to 25 February 1989, the Council of Ministers of OAU adopted a resolution on Namibia (CM/Res.1177 (XLIX)) by which it, inter alia, strongly condemned the Pretoria régime's continued recruitment of Namibians into the so-called South West African Territorial Force (SWATF), the training of tribal armies, the creation of secret ammunition depots in Namibia, as well as the issuing of Namibian identity cards to bandits of the União Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA), South African bantustan elements and South African whites, thus enabling them to participate in the elections and to vote against SWAPO; urged the full implementation of the Protocol of Brazzaville 7/ and New York agreements 5/ together with United Nations Security Council resolution 435 (1978) without deviations and prevarications; called upon States members of OAU to render increased all-round support to SWAPO, and in particular financial, political and material aid, in order to enable it to mount an effective electoral campaign; urged the Secretary-General of the United Nations to expedite the signing of the formal cease-fire agreement between SWAPO and South Africa; further urged the Secretary-General to ensure that in procuring materials for the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), sanctions currently in force, in particular the ban on South African arms, related matériel and military vehicles, were not breached; invited the Secretary-General to ensure that the apartheid régime complied with provisions of Security Council resolution 629 (1989) that it reduce immediately and substantially its existing police force in Namibia, as well as with Council resolution 632 (1989); requested the Secretary-General of OAU to contact the Secretary-General of the United Nations with a view to examining the modalities for an effective participation by OAU in the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) on Namibian independence.

2. Movement of Non-Aligned Countries

42. In the Final Documents 8/ adopted by the Conference of Foreign Ministers of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Nicosia from 5 to 10 September 1988, the Ministers reaffirmed their total support for the United Nations Council for Namibia in its role as the legal Administering Authority of Namibia until its independence. In this regard they welcomed and endorsed the Final Communiqué of the ministerial meeting of the United Nations Council for Namibia held in New York on 2 October 1987 9/ and the Luanda Declaration and Programme of Action, adopted by the United Nations Council for Namibia at its extraordinary plenary meetings held at Luanda from 18 to 22 May 1987. 10/

3. Other intergovernmental meetings

43. The eighteenth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, held at Riyadh from 13 to 16 March 1989, expressed its deep satisfaction at the forthcoming commencement of the implementation of the United Nations plan for the independence of Namibia. 11/ It warmly commended the people of Namibia for their heroic struggle under the leadership of SWAPO, their sole and authentic representative, and assured the people of Namibia of the Conference's solidarity and support in the building of an independent and non-aligned Namibia. The Conference strongly urged its member States and the international community to extend all possible financial and material assistance to the people of Namibia for the consolidation of their sovereignty and territorial integrity and political independence.

III. EFFORTS TO IMPLEMENT THE UNITED NATIONS PLAN FOR THE INDEPENDENCE OF NAMIBIA

A. General

44. The United Nations plan for the independence of Namibia, endorsed by the Security Council in its resolution 435 (1978) of 29 September 1978, provides a universally accepted basis for the peaceful settlement of the Namibian question. Although the Pretoria régime nominally accepted the plan at the time of its adoption, it obdurately refused to co-operate in its implementation for more than a decade.

45. South Africa resorted to one pretext after another to scuttle the efforts of the international community to expedite the implementation of the United Nations plan. At first, it questioned the impartiality of the United Nations to supervise and control the elections envisaged. Then it insisted on linking Namibia's independence to the withdrawal of Cuban troops, a condition which the Security Council in its resolution 539 (1983) declared was contrary to the provisions of the United Nations plan for the independence of Namibia.

46. As indicated, during the period under review, negotiations between Angola, Cuba and South Africa, mediated by the United States, which began in London in May 1988 culminated in the signing in New York on 22 December 1988 of a tripartite agreement on the independence of Namibia on the basis of Security Council resolution 435 (1978). 1/ In their agreement, the parties recommended 1 April 1989 as the date for the commencement of implementation of resolution 435 (1978). A summary of the negotiations and the agreements reached is given below.

B. Developments relating to efforts to bring peace to the south-western region of Africa

47. During 1988, Angola, Cuba and South Africa, with the United States as mediator, began negotiations on a regional peace settlement including the implementation of the United Nations plan for the independence of Namibia. The first round of these negotiations, which came to be referred to widely as the

quadripartite talks, took place in London on 3 and 4 May 1988. A joint communiqué issued after the talks stated that "the meetings took place in a constructive atmosphere" and that "progress was made". 12/

48. The London meetings were followed by bilateral talks between Angola and South Africa in Brazzaville, the Congo, on 12 and 13 May 1988, at which preliminary ideas or opening positions on the timetable of Cuban withdrawal from Angola were exchanged. Angola proposed a four-year timetable while South Africa put forward the view that all Cuban forces should leave Angola within one year of the commencement of the implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978). 13/

49. On 18 and 19 May 1988, senior officials of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States met at Lisbon to discuss steps that both countries might take to facilitate a general settlement of the problems in the south-western region of Africa. 14/ For the first time in the context of these negotiations, the United States and the USSR mentioned 29 September 1988 as a target date for reaching a successful agreement on the conflicts in the region. 15/ The meetings were continued during the summit meeting in Moscow between the Presidents of the USSR and of the United States from 30 May to 2 June. The two sides reiterated their willingness to reach an agreement with the different parties involved in the negotiations by 29 September 1988, the tenth anniversary of the adoption of Security Council resolution 435 (1978). 16/

50. The negotiations gained momentum with the holding of three further rounds of talks at Cairo, New York and Geneva. The meeting at Cairo on 24 and 25 June made little progress. 17/ The meeting itself went ahead despite differences between Angola and South Africa about the choice of venue and despite threats by South Africa that a buildup of Cuban forces in southern Angola might lead it to oppose further talks. It was widely agreed that it was the predicament of the South African Defence Force (SADF) in Angola that had forced Pretoria to co-operate in the implementation of the United Nations plan for the independence of Namibia. 18/

51. Following a general advance on 27 June of Angolan and Cuban troops to southern Angola in the aftermath of the battles for control of the Cuito Cuanavale, a serious armed clash took place at Calueque, near the Angolan/Namibian border where several South African soldiers were killed. Once again, South Africa threatened to withdraw from the quadripartite talks. 19/ However, the prospect that failure to reach a political agreement would lead to a further escalation of the conflict, with prospects of Angolan and Cuban attacks across the border into Namibia, underscored the urgency for South Africa to continue participation in the talks. 20/

52. From 11 to 13 July, the quadripartite talks resumed at the expert level at Governors Island in New York City. 21/ At the conclusion of the talks, agreement was reached on a set of essential principles for the establishment of peace in south-western Africa. On 20 July, following approval by the Governments involved, the text of the 14 Principles for a Peaceful Settlement in South-Western Africa was released. 22/ This was followed by talks involving high-level military delegations from the countries concerned on 22 and 23 July 1988 at Sal Island in Cape Verde. 23/

53. The process took a step forward during another round of negotiations at Geneva from 2 to 5 August. 24/ The talks focused on the practical steps for the implementation of the general principles agreed upon during the meetings at Governors Island on 13 July. The parties came to an understanding on a Geneva Protocol which contained "a sequence of steps ... to achieve peace in south-western Africa". 25/

54. In a joint statement issued on 8 August, the Governments of Angola, Cuba, South Africa and the United States agreed to recommend 1 November 1988 as the date for commencement of the implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978). 25/ Another significant feature of the statement was the declaration of a de facto cessation of hostilities in Namibia and Angola with immediate effect. The parties also pledged to reach agreement by 1 September 1988 on a timetable for the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola.

55. A meeting of the heads of State of the front-line States was held at Luanda on 8 August 1988. In a communiqué issued after the meeting, the heads of State expressed their satisfaction and gave their total support for the results outlined in the joint statement issued at Geneva on 8 August 1988. They called upon the parties concerned to avoid any action that might jeopardize the negotiations. Having noted the positive evolution of the negotiations, with particular emphasis on the quadripartite meeting held at Geneva, the heads of State requested the Secretary-General of the United Nations to take measures aimed at the implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978). 26/

56. On 12 August 1988, the President of SWAPO informed the Secretary-General that his organization had agreed to comply with the commencement of the cessation of all hostile acts, in accordance with the Geneva agreement. He also stated that SWAPO would be ready to continue to abide by that agreement until the formal cease-fire under resolution 435 (1978). He stated that the cessation of SWAPO's combat actions against the South African forces in Namibia would only hold provided that South Africa also showed the necessary political will to do the same. 27/

57. The first meetings of a joint military commission composed of senior military officers from Angola, Cuba and South Africa to supervise the cease-fire took place in the week beginning 15 August at Ruacana on the Angola/Namibia border. 28/ On 22 August, the commission signed a formal cease-fire agreement. 29/ A Joint Military Monitoring Commission (JMMC) was established to supervise and determine the rules under which the cease-fire will operate, as well as to decide on action to be taken in case of violations.

58. The quadripartite talks resumed in Brazzaville from 24 to 26 August to discuss the timetable for the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola. 30/ The meeting was adjourned until September without an agreement. 31/ On 31 August, pursuant to the understandings reached at the talks held at Geneva in early August, South African troops completed their withdrawal from southern Angola. 32/

59. After a new round of talks at Brazzaville from 7 to 9 September, the participants issued a joint statement 33/ in which they pledged to intensify their efforts to reach agreement on a timetable for the withdrawal of Cuban troops and

declared their intention to continue to adhere to the deadline of 1 November 1988 for the implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978). The parties to the quadripartite talks met again at Brazzaville from 26 to 29 September to try to reach an agreement on the timetable for the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola and adjourned without any conclusive agreement. 34/

60. A series of meetings at Brazzaville during November and December 1988 produced on 13 December 1988 an agreement on the final elements for a trilateral treaty among Angola, Cuba and South Africa 1/ relating to the implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978) beginning on 1 April 1989, and the outlines of a related bilateral treaty between Angola and Cuba 2/ specifying a schedule for the phased total withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. The Protocol of Brazzaville 7/ committed the parties to sign these treaties and established a Joint Commission in which the United States and the USSR were invited to participate.

61. Eight months of almost continuous negotiation between Angola, Cuba and South Africa with the United States acting as mediator culminated in the signing on 22 December 1988 at United Nations Headquarters in New York of the tripartite and bilateral agreements referred to above, as agreed in the Geneva and Brazzaville protocols.

C. Security Council

62. It will be recalled that by its resolution 601 (1987) of 30 October 1987 the Security Council, inter alia, affirmed that all outstanding issues relevant to the implementation of its resolution 435 (1978) had been resolved; welcomed the expressed readiness of SWAPO to sign and observe a cease-fire agreement with South Africa; and decided to authorize the Secretary-General to proceed to arrange a cease-fire between South Africa and SWAPO in order to undertake the administrative and other practical steps necessary for the emplacement of UNTAG in the Territory.

63. Regarding the quadripartite talks discussed above, the Secretary-General in his further report concerning the implementation of Security Council resolutions 435 (1978) and 439 (1978) concerning the question of Namibia 26/ said that the parties to the talks had kept him informed of the progress of their negotiations and that in his exchanges of views with them he had welcomed the agreements reached and urged them to redouble their efforts to facilitate a settlement.

64. From 21 to 23 September 1988, the Secretary-General visited South Africa to discuss preparations for the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) and related matters. He also visited Angola on 23 and 24 September to discuss with the President of Angola the situation in south-western Africa. While in Luanda, the Secretary-General also met with the President of SWAPO and informed him of the outcome of his visit to Pretoria.

65. On 29 September 1988, on the tenth anniversary of the adoption of resolution 435 (1978), the President of the Security Council made a statement on behalf of the members of the Council concerning the situation in Namibia. 35/ The members of the Council stated that they supported the actions by the Secretary-General in regard

to the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) and encouraged him to continue his efforts to that end. They took particular note of the developments by parties to the quadripartite talks to find a peaceful solution to the conflict in south-western Africa. They urged the parties to display the necessary political will to translate into reality the commitments which had been made in order to bring about a peaceful settlement of the Namibian question and to achieve peace and stability in the region. In particular, they strongly urged South Africa to comply forthwith with the Security Council's resolutions and decisions, particularly resolution 435 (1978), and to co-operate with the Secretary-General in its immediate, full and definitive implementation.

66. Following the signing of the tripartite and bilateral agreements at United Nations Headquarters in New York on 22 December 1988, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 629 (1989) on 16 January 1989. By that resolution, the Council, inter alia, decided that 1 April 1989 should be the date on which implementation of resolution 435 (1978) would begin; requested the Secretary-General to proceed to arrange a formal cease-fire between SWAPO and South Africa; called upon South Africa to reduce immediately and substantially the existing police forces in Namibia with a view to achieving reasonable balance between those forces and UNTAG so as to ensure effective monitoring by the latter; reaffirmed the responsibility of all concerned to co-operate to ensure the impartial implementation of the settlement plan in accordance with resolution 435 (1978); requested the Secretary-General to prepare at the earliest possible date a report to the Council on the implementation of resolution 435 (1978), taking into account all relevant developments since the adoption of that resolution; also requested the Secretary-General, in preparing his report, to re-examine requirements necessary for UNTAG in order to identify wherever possible tangible cost-saving measures without prejudice to his ability fully to carry out its mandate as established in 1978, namely, to ensure the early independence of Namibia through free and fair elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations, and called upon Members of the United Nations to consider, in co-ordination with the Secretary-General, how they might provide economic and financial assistance to the Namibian people, both during the transitional period and after independence.

67. On 20 January 1989, the African Group at the United Nations issued a press statement in New York on Namibian independence. 36/ The text of the statement is given in annex I to the present report.

68. That statement was followed by a communiqué on the question of Namibia issued by the Co-ordinating Bureau of Non-Aligned Countries on 23 January 1989. 37/ The text of the communiqué appears in annex II to the present report.

69. In part II of his further report of 23 January 1989, 26/ submitted in pursuance of the request addressed to him in Security Council resolution 629 (1989), the Secretary-General elaborated on matters related to his recommendations for implementation of the United Nations plan for Namibia with effect from 1 April 1989.

70. The Secretary-General said that on 20 December 1988 he had received a visit from the representatives of the five permanent members of the Security Council. They informed him that they were convinced that UNTAG could carry out its primary function of ensuring free and fair elections in Namibia in a substantially more economical manner, particularly with respect to the size of the military component to be deployed. He said that in subsequent contacts with representatives of the permanent members they had pointed out that their Governments would be responsible for 57 per cent of the costs of UNTAG and that the establishment of an operation larger than they thought necessary would both put in question the financing of that operation and jeopardize the prospects for other peace-keeping operations in the future.

71. In the same report, the Secretary-General also said that on 21 December 1988 he had received a visit from the permanent representatives of a number of non-aligned countries, including the non-aligned members of the Security Council, the front-line States, Nigeria and SWAPO. The representatives expressed grave reservations about moves to tamper with the military component of UNTAG, because such a move would violate Security Council resolution 435 (1978) and would compromise the Secretary-General's ability to conduct free and fair elections in Namibia. They noted that the situation in Namibia had become more complex since 1978, notably because of the consolidation of the South African military, police and administrative presence. In view of this, they were of the opinion that, if anything, there was a need for an increase in the military component of UNTAG but that it was not their wish to renegotiate the existing settlement plan.

72. The Secretary-General stated that he thought it right to submit to the Council a concept of operations which would not be wholly satisfactory to either side or to him, but one which offered the best available prospect of fulfilling his mandate to ensure the early independence of Namibia through free and fair elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations, while at the same time enjoying the necessary financial support of the Members of the Organization.

73. The concept of operations which the Secretary-General recommended was as follows: 26/

> "54. ... (a) The Force Commander would concentrate on the tasks of monitoring the disbandment of the citizen forces, commando units and ethnic forces, including SWATF, monitoring SADF forces in Namibia, as well as SWAPO forces in neighbouring countries and supervising and securing installations in the northern border area;
>
> "(b) The authorized upper limit for the military component of UNTAG would remain at 7,500;
>
> "(c) Three enlarged infantry battalions, each averaging 850 all ranks, would be deployed initially, with the other battalions being held in reserve. This would provide as many operational troops as five battalions of the size envisaged in the earlier deployment plan, but with the overall numbers being reduced because of the regrouping of the operational troops, and the consequent elimination of some headquarters and administrative elements;

"(d) To permit the transfer of certain tasks from infantry to military observers, the military observer element deployed initially would be increased from 200 to 300 officers;

"(e) The logistic elements deployed initially would total about 1,700 all ranks and would be appropriate for a force of three enlarged infantry battalions and 300 military observers, taking into account also the need for the military logistic elements to support the civilian component;

"(f) Budgetary provisions would at this stage be presented to the General Assembly on the basis of a military component of 4,650 consisting of 3 enlarged infantry battalions, 300 military observers, about 1,700 logistic troops and headquarters staff of about 100, all ranks;

"(g) If it should become apparent during the course of the transitional period that a military component of this size was insufficient to assist my Special Representative in carrying out his mandate of ensuring the early independence of Namibia through free and fair elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations and that there was a real need for additional military personnel, the Secretary-General would so inform the Security Council and, subject to there being no objection from the Council, would deploy as many of the reserve battalions, with appropriate logistic elements, as he judged to be necessary. I would seek urgent financial provisions from the General Assembly for this additional deployment. I trust that, under such circumstances, I could count on the support of all members of the Council, particularly its permanent members, to help to meet the logistic commitments involved in an urgent deployment of this kind, including assistance with airlift to the mission area as a voluntary contribution."

74. On 9 February 1989, the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council an explanatory statement 38/ concerning his further report. In his explanatory statement, the Secretary-General addressed the concerns raised during his extensive consultations with the various parties about some of the recommendations contained in his further report.

75. In his explanatory statement, the Secretary-General stated, inter alia,

"...

"4. In paragraph 54 of my report, I recommended to the Security Council a concept of operations which in the circumstances seemed to me to offer the best available prospect of ensuring the early independence of Namibia through free and fair elections in accordance with the timing decided by the Council. I should like to reiterate that, under this concept of operations, the authorized upper limit for the military component of UNTAG would remain at 7,500, as stipulated in the explanatory statement of 28 September 1978 (S/12869) and approved by the Security Council in its resolution 435 (1978). While confirming this fundamental provision for the military component of UNTAG, I recommended to the Security Council that budgetary provisions should at this stage be presented to the General Assembly on the basis of a military

component of 4,650 personnel consisting of 3 enlarged infantry battalions, 300 military observers, about 1,700 logistic troops and headquarters staff of about 100, all ranks. These would be the number of troops initially deployed in Namibia while at the same time the figure of 7,500 would be maintained as the authorized upper limit of the military component. The three enlarged battalions would provide the Force Commander with 15 line companies (i.e., troops available for optional duties in the field), which is only 3 fewer than the 18 line companies which would have been provided by the six smaller battalions envisaged in the earlier deployment plan. Under the concept of operations outlined in my report, the reserve battalions would be available at short notice for service in Namibia, in order to meet any unforeseen developments in regard to the overall mandate of UNTAG.

"5. The mandate of the military component of UNTAG, as approved in Security Council resolution 435 (1978), remains unchanged. Paragraph 54 (a) of my report specifies only the tasks on which it is envisaged that the Force Commander would concentrate. No tasks have been eliminated. Moreover, final and definitive decisions concerning functional priorities and deployment can be taken only in the light of the circumstances prevalent at the time of implementation. In this connection, I intend to keep under constant review throughout the transitional period both the deployment of the military component of UNTAG and its size in relation to its ability to carry out its full mandate in the actual situation on the ground. I will not fail to inform the Security Council if the situation requires the deployment of additional military personnel to Namibia. I have been assured by all the members of the Security Council, including the permanent members, that they will extend their fullest co-operation to me in terms of paragraph 54 (g) of my report and that they will respond promptly to any need for additional military personnel which I might deem warranted, up to the authorized upper limit of 7,500."

76. After considering the Secretary-General's further report and explanatory statement, the Security Council on 16 February 1989 adopted resolution 632 (1989) by which it, inter alia, approved the report of the Secretary-General and his explanatory statement for the implementation of the United Nations plan for Namibia; decided to implement its resolution 435 (1978) in its original and definitive form to ensure conditions in Namibia which would allow the Namibian people to participate freely and without intimidation in the electoral process under the supervision and control of the United Nations leading to early independence of the Territory; expressed its full support for and co-operation with the Secretary-General in carrying out the mandate entrusted to him by the Security Council under its resolution 435 (1978); and called upon all parties concerned to honour their commitments to the United Nations plan and to co-operate fully with the Secretary-General in the implementation of the resolution.

77. Pursuant to Security Council resolutions 629 (1989) and 632 (1989), the Secretary-General's Special Representative for Namibia arrived in Windhoek on 31 March 1989 to supervise and control free and fair elections in Namibia on the basis of Security Council resolution 435 (1978), whose implementation began on 1 April 1989.

Notes

1/ A/43/989-S/20346, annex. To be incorporated in Official Records of the Security Council, Forty-third Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1988.

2/ S/20345, annex. To be incorporated in Official Records of the Security Council, Forty-third Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1988.

3/ Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 16.

4/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-second Session, Supplement No. 24 (A/42/24), para. 493.

5/ S/20345, annex; A/43/989-S/20346, annex. Both to be incorporated in Official Records of the Security Council, Forty-third Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1988.

6/ A/43/398, annex II, AHG/Decl.1 (XXIV) Rev.1.

7/ A/43/964-S/20325, annex.

8/ A/43/667-S/20212.

9/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-third Session, Supplement No. 24 (A/43/24), para. 86.

10/ Ibid., Forty-second Session, Supplement No. 24 (A/42/24), para. 203.

11/ A/43/235-S/20600.

12/ The New York Times, 4 May 1988; The Guardian (London), 4 and 5 May 1988; Financial Times (London), 4 May 1988.

13/ West Africa, 23 May 1988; The New York Times, 13 May 1988.

14/ Financial Times (London), 19 May 1988; The New york Times, 20 May 1988; The Windhoek Advertiser, 18 May 1988.

15/ The Windhoek Advertiser, 23 May 1988.

16/ The New York Times, 6 June 1988.

17/ The New York Times and The Guardian (London), 27 June 1988.

18/ The Guardian (London), 16 May 1988; The New York Times, 17 May 1988.

19/ The New York Times, 30 June 1988; The Windhoek Advertiser, 29 June 1988.

Notes (continued)

20/ The New York Times, 30 June 1988; West Africa, 25 July 1988.

21/ Jeune Afrique, 27 July 1988; The Guardian (London), 14 July 1988; The New York Times, 14 July 1988.

22/ S/20412, annex. To be incorporated in Official Records of the Security Council, Forty-fourth Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1989.

23/ The New York Times, 25 July 1988.

24/ The New York Times, 3 and 6 August 1988; The Guardian (London), 5 August 1988.

25/ A/43/521-S/20109, annex. To be incorporated in Official Records of the Security Council, Forty-third Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1988.

26/ See S/20412. To be incorporated in Official Records of the Security Council, Forty-fourth Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1989.

27/ See S/20129, annex. To be incorporated in Official Records of the Security Council, Forty-third Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1988.

28/ The Guardian (London) and The Windhoek Advertiser, 17 August 1988; The New York Times, 16 Aguust 1988.

29/ The Windhoek Advertiser, 23 August 1988.

30/ The Washington Post, 24 August 1988; The New York Times, 25 August 1988.

31/ The Guardian (London), The Washington Post and The New York Times, 28 August 1988.

32/ The New York Times and The Washington Post, 31 August 1988.

33/ The New York Times, 10 September 1988.

34/ The Windhoek Advertiser, 30 September 1988; The New York Times, 27 and 30 September 1988.

35/ See S/20208. To be incorporated in Official Records of the Security Council, Forty-third Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1988.

36/ A/44/89-S/20414, annex. To be incorporated in Official Records of the Security Council, Forty-fourth Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1989.

Notes (continued)

37/ A/44/90-S/20415, annex. To be incorporated in Official Records of the Security Council, Forty-fourth Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1989.

38/ S/20457. To be incorporated in Official Records of the Security Council, Forty-fourth Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1989.

Annex I

PRESS STATEMENT ISSUED IN NEW YORK ON 20 JANUARY 1989
BY THE AFRICAN GROUP ON NAMIBIAN INDEPENDENCE*

The African Group at the United Nations has learned with grave concern of reports to the effect that some members of the Security Council are trying to pressure the United Nations Secretariat to propose severe reductions of the budget for the preparations leading to the independence of Namibia.

According to this information, these members want the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) military personnel to be reduced from 7,500 to 4,000. This is not only contrary to the letter and spirit of Security Council resolution 435 (1978), which set an upper limit of 7,500 military personnel, but also would be going counter to the provisions of Security Council resolution 629 (1989). The latter resolution requests the Secretary-General to propose cost-saving measures, wherever possible, but without prejudicing the ability of UNTAG to carry out its mandate.

It is important to point out to the international community that the racist Pretoria régime already has over 100,000 soldiers in Namibia and other paramilitary and ethnic forces, not to mention a police force of over 13,000.

After decades of being brutalized by the racist régime's instruments of coercion, a meagre United Nations force of 7,500 is barely adequate to restore the confidence of the long-suffering Namibian people, let alone the 4,000 being proposed to cover a territory of about 824,269 square kilometres. At a time when the Namibian people are anxiously awaiting free and fair elections, the reduction of UNTAG military personnel will deprive them of the right freely to choose their representatives.

The African Group at the United Nations rejects the proposed reduction and calls upon the international community to raise its voice against the cuts.

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* Previously issued as A/44/89-S/20414, annex.

Annex II

COMMUNIQUE ON THE QUESTION OF NAMIBIA, ISSUED BY THE CO-ORDINATING BUREAU OF NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES ON 23 JANUARY 1989*

The Co-ordinating Bureau of Non-Aligned Countries held an urgent meeting in New York on 23 January 1989 in the wake of persistent disturbing reports that some permanent members of the Security Council were subjecting the United Nations Secretariat to undue pressures to propose a reduction in the military component of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) from 7,500 to 4,500 as a cost-saving measure in the budget for the preparations leading to the independence of Namibia.

The Bureau recalled that in 1978 when the Security Council, through its resolution 435 (1978), set an upper limit of 7,500 military personnel to prevent intimidation and infiltration and to ensure the safe return of refugees and their free participation in the electoral process, South Africa had 45,000 soldiers and a 2,500-strong police force in Namibia. Today, the Pretoria régime maintains about 100,000 soldiers and a 10,000-strong police force, a 24,000- to 35,000-strong territorial force and other paramilitary and ethnic military units in Namibia. The Bureau, therefore, was deeply concerned that, in the light of this vast increase in South Africa's forces of repression and after the Namibian people had been subjected to decades of brutalization by the same instruments of oppression, a reduced United Nations force would hardly restore confidence among the people of Namibia and assure them that they can freely participate in the electoral process without fear of coercion and intimidation from the ubiquitous South African forces.

The Bureau noted that the proposed reductions were contrary to the letter and spirit of Security Council resolution 629 (1989) which, after expressing concern at the increase in the police and paramilitary forces and the establishment of the South West African territorial forces since 1978, requests the Secretary-General to identify cost-saving measures, wherever possible, but without prejudicing the ability of UNTAG to carry out its mandate.

The Bureau denounced the manoeuvres to impede the preparation by the Secretary-General of a fair and honest report and warned that such actions could delay consideration of the report by the Security Council. It also rejected the deliberate and mischievous representation that Security Council resolution 629 (1989) directs the Secretary-General to effect cuts, and determined that the motive for the contemplated downsizing of the military component of UNTAG can only be aimed at strengthening the hand of the South African Administrator-General and his forces to manipulate the electoral process, while placing the United Nations at a disadvantage. The Bureau, therefore, called upon the international community to reject in advance any such moves as sinister and unacceptable.

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* Previously issued as A/44/90-S/20415, annex.

UNITED NATIONS

A

General Assembly

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4 May 1990

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

UNITED NATIONS COUNCIL FOR NAMIBIA

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS RELATED TO NAMIBIA

Report of Standing Committee II

Chairman: Mr. Shaukat UMER (Pakistan)

Corrigendum

1. Page 13, paragraph 47, line 1
Page 13, paragraph 51, line 5
Page 13, paragraph 52, line 1
Page 14, paragraph 58, line 1
Page 15, paragraph 59, line 3
Page 16, paragraph 65, line 3

For quadripartite read tripartite

2. Page 14, paragraph 55, lines 4 to 7 should read

in the joint statement issued at Geneva on 8 August 1988 by the Governments of Angola, Cuba, South Africa and the United States. 25/ The heads of State called upon the parties concerned to avoid any action that might jeopardize the negotiations. Having noted the positive evolution of the negotiations, with particular emphasis on the meeting held at Geneva, the heads of State requested the

3. Page 15, paragraph 60, line 3

For footnote 1/ read footnote 7/

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